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ABSTRACT

The network externality function plays a very important role in the study of economic
network industries. Moreover, the consumer group dynamic interactions coupled with
network externality concept is going to play a dominant role in the network goods in the
21st century. The existing literature is stemmed on a choice of externality function with
certain quantitative properties. The utility function coupled with the network externality
function is used to investigate static properties of rational equilibrium. The aim of this
work is to systematically initiate a development of quantitative effects of the concept of
network externality and its influence on the characteristics of network market
equilibrium.
We introduce several basic concepts, notably, network externality process and network
goods. Formulating a principle of network externality, we developed a mathematical
dynamic model (1) for the network externality process. A closed form solution of the
mathematical model was determined and analyzed (2). The presented qualitative and
quantitative analysis provides a systematic and unified way of constructing the existing
network externality function. The solution process is called “Generalized Network
Externality Function (GNEF)”. Moreover, our study of quantitative description,
parametric representation of attributes and sensitivity analysis of network externality
process provides a tool for planning, policy and performance for network goods (3).

x

In the absence of desired data set, we presented an illustration to exhibit the significance
of GNEF. We used two types of data sets on the US banking asset and deposit.
Employing nonlinear regression methods and data sets, we developed statistical models
for the US banking asset and deposit, and constructed two normalized the US banking
deposit models (4). Finally, using the concept of theory of relative growth and GNEF (4),
we developed two dynamic models for the network externality for the US banking asset
with respect to the US banking deposit as a financial market share (5).
Incorporating the GNEF (2) in the consumer utility function, a concept of market share
adjustment function is introduced and utilized to develop dynamic models for existing
rational and static expectation processes (6). In fact, the role and scope of dynamic
models of market share adjustment process are extended to the well-known adaptive
expectation and its extension process (7). Using a fixed point theorem and the method of
upper and lower solutions of discrete time processes, the existence of equilibrium states
of developed dynamic models of market share adjustment processes are established in a
systematic way (8). Furthermore, the qualitative properties (stability and oscillatory) of
equilibrium states are investigated in terms of model and speed of adjustment parameters.
Moreover, the system parameter space is decomposed according to qualitative properties
(stability, instability and oscillatory) and the type of expectation processes.
Very recently, the idea of local network externality is utilized to characterize the rational
equilibrium (under fulfilled expectation assumptions). From the study on two-scale
network dynamic model of human mobility process an eco-socio-culture interactions, we
note that heterogeneity in the network goods consumer community generates a local
network externality. Furthermore, dynamic models of adaptive expectation processes

xi

(6,7) for network goods provide tool to extend the characterization of rational equilibrium
study to static, current and lagged adaptive types equilibriums. Here, we treat the
consumer decision to be a dynamic process. We formulate a dynamic structural
representation of a consumer network structure, structure of utility function and decision
rule under the influence of local network externality concept (9). For the consumer
network structure, we generalize the one-dimensional Hotelling location line model to
multi-dimensional location (10). This formulation generates a mathematical model for a
consumer decision dynamic process (11). The byproduct of the dynamic model leads to
an agent-based simulation model (12). The simulation model is employed to investigate
different types of consumer decision dynamic market equilibriums. Moreover, prototype
illustrations are given to exhibit the association between network attributes and its market
equilibriums.
We extend the work of two firms (duopoly) into multi-firms (oligopoly and monopolistic
competition). This work shed light on the policies for manager to meet performance goal
of their firm in network goods industry.
In future, we propose to extend this work to incorporate random fluctuations, to remove
restrictions and the local and global economic framework in the 21st century.

xii

CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS AND TOOLS

This chapter deals with a basic preliminary concepts and tools needed to undertake the
study of network externality process. It is obvious that the usefulness of fax machine
depends on the number of machines because users have more channels to contact. There
are some goods and services that have this property, that is, consumer’s utility will be
affected by the number of consumers who consume the same goods and services. In
economics, this positive influence is called network externality. The goods and services
characterized by such property are called network goods. In this chapter, definition, type
and source of network externality are reviewed in Section 1.1. Some tools in this
dissertation are briefed in Section 1.2.

1.1 Network Externality Concepts
1.1.1 Definition of Network Externality
Network externality is composed of two economics terms “network” and “externality”.
First, the term “Network” refers to a group of interacting consumers of similar goods and
services. Second, the term “Externality” is a well-known term in economics (Bishop,
2009) which means an additional benefit or cost created by unrelated third parties. For
example, pollutant emitted by a factory creates negative externality to nearby residents
for their health whereas planting tree creates positive externality. Moreover, some
1

activities create both positive and negative such as singing a song, slow driving. Thus, the
term “Network Externality” shortly means an additional benefit or cost created by
network.
The interaction inside the consumer network creates externality to the members of
network. Thus, the larger size of membership in the network generates the greater
externality, that is, the magnitude of network externality increases when the size of
network increases. Alternatively, there is another term used, “network effect”,
interchangeably. Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) discuss their differences. In this work,
the “Network Externality” term is used. In the following, we review some related terms
to network externality:
1.1.1.1 Metcalfe’s Law
The value of network is proportional to the square of network size because a network size
has

(

)

possible unique connections. See Metacafe (1995).

1.1.1.2 Bandwagon Effect
People do something because others are doing it, regardless of their own belief. This is
referred as the “bandwagon effect”. For example, once a particular good or service
becomes popular, more people tend to buy it, too. See Colman (2009).
1.1.1.3 Snob Effect
The value of item increases as the availability decreases. This is called “snob effect”. For
examples, art works, rare stamps and coins. This concept relates to the negative network
externality. See Leibenstein (1950).

2

1.1.1.4 Veblen Effect
Thorstein Veblen (1899) argued that wealthy individuals often consume highly
conspicuous goods in order to advertise their wealth, thereby achieving greater social
status.
1.1.1.5 Cluster Effect
The congregation of consumers and producers of a particular good or service induces
other consumers and producers to relocate there. This is known as the “cluster effect”.
1.1.2 Type of Network Externality
1.1.2.1 Direct versus Indirect
The term “Direct” refers to the network externality through the usefulness of goods such
as fax machine, e-mail, telephone, etc. While the term “Indirect” refers to the network
externality through its complementary goods and related goods which can in turn the
value of the original goods. For instance, when number of iPhone user increase,
developers have motivation to create more applications which is increase the value of
iPhone. See more Katz and Shapiro (1994).
1.1.2.2 Local Network Externality
The term “Local” refers to the consumer’s utility is affected by the size of neighbor rather
than entire network. For example, a decision of programmer to choose programming
software is affected by what software that his neighbor used the most. The usage of the
whole market has less effect than the usage of his neighbor (Banerji and Dutta (2009)).

3

1.1.3. Source of Network Externality
1.1.3.1 Exchange
Facebook without friend is almost useless. The utility from Facebook depends on the
number of your friends because we have more channels to interact. For some goods, the
interactions inside network create additional benefit to the member of network
(Gallaugher (2012)).
1.1.3.2 Knowledge Base
A discussion forum of a particular good gives much useful information about the good.
For a large network, the experienced users usually help new users through an organized
discussion forum. Consequently, a new consumer is induced to buy a good that has a
larger network.
1.1.3.3 Switching Cost
Imagine you were expert in the Windows OS, will you buy a MacBook Pro? The answer
is “No”, because you don’t want to spend your time to learn how to use the Mac OS.
However, you might buy it, if you know that the Windows OS is dying. Consequently, at
the first time of learning, you will choose the operating system (OS) that has a larger
network because it will not die soon, (Shapiro and Varian (1999)).
1.1.3.4 Complementary and Related Goods
Complementary and related goods add more benefit to the good. A millions of
applications, songs and Podcasts in iTunes enhance the value of choosing
iPhone/iPad/iPod over a rival like the Microsoft Zune. And again, the larger network
usually offers a larger add-on market (Gallaugher (2012)).

4

1.2 Mathematical Preliminaries
In this dissertation, we develop a dynamic model for the network goods. We employ
mathematical results to develop the theoretical algorithms (theorems/corollaries). We
utilize the statistical methods to estimate and to test the parameters to validate the
theoretical modeling. Finally, in absence of data set, we use programming and simulation
to validate the model and draw a few inferences.
1.2.1 Mathematical Tools
1.2.1.1 Existence of solution of algebraic equations
Definition 1.2.1 Let

be such that

lower and upper quasisolutions of
(

[ ]

( )

. Then
if

are said to be coupled
(

[ ]

[ ] ) or

[ ] ).

The following theorem provides the existence of solution of algebraic equations.
Theorem 1.6.1 in Ladde et al (1985)
[

Assume that

are coupled lower and upper quasisolutions of ( )

further that

(
whenever

̅

such that
of ( )

] and process a mixed quasimonotone property. Suppose

[ ]

[ ] )
and
as

such that

(̅ [ ]

[ ] )

(

and
̅)

. Then there exist monotone sequences {
and

}{

}

are coupled minimal and maximal solutions
for any solutions, .
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1.2.1.2 Testing stability of solution process
The following results provides a mathematical tool to establish the stability of the
equilibrium states (solutions of algebraic equations associated with the rate functions in
dynamic models) of systems.
Theorem 1.2.2 in Ladde and Sambandham (1985)
( ) be a sequence of m-dimensional random vectors such that

Let

( )

(

( )

)

( ) be the solution process of

Let

( )
where (

)

(

( )

),

( )

( )

is a sequence of Borel measurable functions on

satisfying the following relation
(

)

(

)

for

Then
( )

( )

(

for

)

provided
( )
Corollary 1.2.3 If

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )

[

( )

], and
( )

( ) satisfy an inequality

( )

Then
( )

( )∏

( )

∑

( )∏

)]

∑

( )

( )

and moreover
( )

( )

[∑

( ( )
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[∑

( ( )

)]

1.2.2 Statistical Tools
1.2.2.1 Newton-Raphson Method
The Gauss-Newton method for estimating nonlinear parameters can be considered as a
special case of the more general Newton-Raphson method (Seber and Wild (1989)). The
Newton-Raphson method uses a local quadratic approximation of an objective function.
1.2.2.2 Homogeneity tes(
For homogeneity test (Endrenyi and Kwong (1981)), first, we ﬁt the model, and then
order the residuals as ̂(

̂(

)

squared residuals to the ﬁrst

̂( ) . Secondly, we compute the ratio of the last

)

squared residuals. The suggestion for

is

. Under

these considerations, the homogeneity test is as follow:
( )

( )

vs

∑

̂( )
∑

̂( )

1.2.2.3 Normality test
For normality test (Shapiro and Wilk (2008)), the null and alternative hypothesis are:
The random sample,

, is drawn from normally distributed population

The random sample,
We compute
sample mean. (

, is not drawn from normally distributed population.

∑
∑

()

( ()

)

̅)

where

(

()

)

; ̅ is the

is order statistic for

, where

(

)

are the expected values of the order statistics of independent and identically
distributed random sample from the standard normal distribution, and
covariance matrix of the order statistics.
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is

1.2.3 Programming and Simulation
To obtain the market equilibrium state of the developed dynamic model, we utilize the
agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS, Axelord (1997)). Agent-based modeling
simulation is a recently introduced simulation approach to analyze enter-agent
interactions. There are at least three advantages of the ABMS. First, its assumptions
underlying the model are simple. Simplicity is also helpful for readers to understand and
for researcher to extend the model. Secondly, the complex adaptive process belongs to
the work of simulation. Thus, complex tools aren’t needed here. Thirdly, because of
ABMS, all network attributes are traceable from initial state to steady state. The ABMS is
more feasible. It is based on certain assumptions and adaptable attributes of agents.
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CHAPTER 2
GENERALIZED NETWORK EXTERNALITY FUNCTION

In this chapter, we focus on the development of mathematical modeling of network
externality processes. The introduction of the generalized network externality function
provides a unified source of a tool for developing and analyzing the planning, policy and
performance of the network externality process and network goods in a systematic way.
This leads to fulfill all existing network externality assumptions as special cases. We
study its properties and applications. This study provides quantitative descriptions,
parametric representations of attributes and sensitivity analysis of network externality
processes. In particular, parametric variations characterize planning, policy and
performance for network goods.

2.1 Introduction
In the study of network industries and sciences, the network externality function plays a
very significant role. This function coupled with supply and demand functions is
successfully utilized in the study of economics of network industries (Shy, 2001). We
remark that the concept of network externality was introduced by Bell’s employee, N.
Lytkins (1917). Historically, the network externality function is motivated by its
usefulness in economics. Moreover, the development of the research in this area is
centered on the augmentations of qualitative properties of the network externality
9

function (Economides (1996); Church and Gandal (1992); Economides and Viard,
(2003); Gottinger (2003); Bayer and Chan (2007); Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006); von
Seggern, (2007). A further relevant historical developments and results are summarized
in the following.
The network externality function (Katz and Shapiro, 1986) is the function that describes
the relationship between network value and its corresponding size. Let
of a network good,

be market share

be the network externality function and

( ) be the

network externality value. From the definition of network externality function
(Economides, 1996), we note that the network externality value increases when the size
of market share increases, that is, the first derivative of
( )

is positive, and hence

.

(2.1.1)

The early existing research work in the area of network externality function is centered
on the linearity assumption on externality function:
( )

(2.1.2)

.

For more details see Church and Gandal (1992), Economides and Viard (2003), Gottinger
(2003), Bayer and Chan (2007).
The idea of diminishing return was incorporated into the network externality function by
Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006). Furthermore, the first derivative of function approaches to
zero when the market share is very large, that is,
( )

(2.1.3)

Recently, Lin (2008) has considered the following flexible functional form of network
externality function:
( )
The expression for

(

).

in (1.4) was based on the following qualitative properties:
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(2.1.4)

( )

1. Negatively marginal function,
2.

is concave function when

3.

is convex function when

4.

is linear function when

;
;

;
.

Moreover, Hans-Werner Gottinger (2003) has classified the network externality function
into categories, namely, linear, logarithmic and exponential functional forms. See Table
2.1. The linear function postulates that, as the network grows, the marginal value
approaches to a constant. The logarithmic function postulates that, as a network grows,
the marginal value diminishes. In this formulation, network externality at the limit must
be either negative or zero. The exponential function postulates that, as a network grows,
the marginal value increases. This type of network externality function is referred to as
‘Metcalfe’s Law, Robert Metcalfe (1995).
Table 2.1 Historical summary of network externality function under various assumptions
Assumption
I
II
III

Sign of ( )
Zero
Negative
Positive

Graphical Shape
Line
Concave
Convex

In this chapter, we recognize the rapid growth in communication, science and technology
in the 21st century. The international activities are significantly increasing. The different
types of consumers (local/global level) are able to interact with each other easily and
more frequently. We further recognize the ideas of Katz and Shapiro (1986), Economides
(1996), Lin (2008), von Seggern (2007), Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006), Gottinger (2003)
and the historical assumptions regarding the various forms of network externality
functions. We observe that the group dynamic interactions (Ladde et al, 2012) are going
to play a significant role in network goods in the 21st century. The idea of a group
11

dynamic coupled with the network externality concept leads to a notion of network
externality process. This further strengthens our motivation to undertake a study of the
development of dynamic model of network externality process, its fundamental
properties and significance. In Section 2.2, we present a principle of network externality
process and develop a mathematical model. Using the mathematical model of network
externality process, we study the properties of network externality function in Section
2.3. In Section 2.4, we briefly outline the significance of the dynamic model of network
externality process, in particular, parametric variation analysis to characterize the various
aspects of network externality process, namely, planning, policy and performance. The
role, scope and future directions of the research are outline in Section 2.5.

2.2 Network Externality Process
In this section, we formally introduce a few terms: consumer network, network goods and
network externality process. We consider a consumer/user network as a group of
interacting consumers/users of similar goods/services/information/knowledge/entities.
The similar good under the discussion of consumer network is referred to as a network
good. The consumer group interacting process of network goods is called a network
externality process. Network externality processes influence the values of network goods.
The value of network goods is influenced by both consumer demand-supply functions as
well as the network externality process. The influence of network externality process of
the network goods is measured by the consumer/user network size/share. The value of a
network good influenced by a network externality process is called network externality
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value. It is determined by the current market size/share. This process leads to the wellknown definition of network externality function (Katz and Shapiro, 1986).
Example 2.2.1 Let us consider a game console as a network good. The consumer
network is a group of consumers who purchased a game console (Xbox/PS3/Wii). Here,
Xbox/PS3/Wii are network goods. The network externality process is the consumer group
interactions such as sharing their games, accessories, knowledge, experiences and
opinions about the game console. The network externality value is the value of a game
console generated by this group’s interaction process.
Example 2.2.2 Let us consider Microsoft Word. We know that when the number of
Microsoft Word users increase, the value of goods will increase. This is due to the fact
that they have more channels to share their files. In this case, Microsoft Word is a
network good.
Example 2.2.3 Let us consider a rare good for example an antique. When the number of
owners increases, the value of goods must decrease. Thus, the taste of valuable features
of the goods diminishes. In this case, the antique is a network good.
On the basis of the work (Ben-Zion and Tavor, 2006), we noted that as the market
share/size increases the network externality value approaches to one of the two distinct
critical levels in a monotonic manner. This leads to concepts of lower and upper limits of
the network externality process.
Definition 2.2.1 The Lower Limit of Network Externality Value is the greatest lower
bound (

) or the infimum of range of network externality function,

.

Definition 2.2.2 The Upper Limit of Network Externality Value is the least upper bound
(

) or the supremum of the range of the network externality function,
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.

Remark 2.2.1 The Lower and upper limits of network externality values are referred to
as stationary/equilibrium states of network externality process.
Definition 2.2.3 The Excess Network Externality is the difference (relative change)
between the current state and the lower limit of the network externality process.
Definition 2.2.4 The Deficit Network Externality is the difference (relative change)
between the upper limit and the current state of the network externality process.
In the following, we provide examples to illustrate the above presented concepts.
Example 2.2.4 From Example 2.2.2, we interpret the lower limit as the minimum value
of goods at the minimum level of market share and the upper limit as the maximum value
of goods at maximum level of market share. The excess network externality is a degree of
the value when the market share is not low. The deficit network externality is the loss of
the value when the market share is not high. For more examples, see Shy (2001).
Example 2.2.5 From Example 2.2.3, we interpret the lower and upper limits as the
threshold values of the affinity/taste of valuable features. The excess network externality
is level of affinity/taste when market share is not very large. The deficit network
externality is loss of affinity/taste when market share is not very low.
On the basis of the above development and based on historical assumptions on the
network externality value, Katz and Shapiro (1986), Economides (1996), Ben-Zion and
Tavor (2006),Lin (2008), Gottinger (2003), we state a principle of network externality
process. Moreover, we develop a mathematical model for network externality process.
This development provides the quantitative description about the historical assumptions
regarding the network externality function, the parametric representation of attributes of
network externality process and planning, policy and performance.
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Principle of Network Externality Process: The rate of change of network externality of
network goods is directly proportional to the product of the excess network externality
per unit of current/used market share and the deficit network externality per unit of
unused market share.
Development dynamic model of network externality process: Let ,

and

be the

network externality, the lower and upper limits of network externality process,
respectively, for network goods. Thus,

is the excess network externality, and

is the deficit network externality of the network goods. Consequently,
network externality per used market share, and

is the excess

is deficit network externality per

unused market share. By the principle of network externality process, the dynamic of
network externality process is described by
(

where

, and

)(

)

(2.2.1)

.

is a constant of proportionality, and the sign of

types of network goods;

and (

,

)

depends on the

is the initial value of the

network externality function of the network goods at its initial market share,

. By

solving this differential equation, we have the closed form expression for the network
externality function:
(

)
(

)(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

).

(2.2.2)

Remark 2.2.2 For a newly introduced network goods, that is comparable to existing
network goods, it is reasonably realistic to have an available market share. For this
purpose, we can relax the domain of definition restriction in (2.2.2). Let

and

be

numbers between zero and one, representing minimum and maximum market shares of a
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given network good, respectively. Under this modified domain, the modified version of
(2.2.1) is obtained by replacing

(

)

and

(

)

in (2.2.1) by (

) and (

),

respectively. Hence,
(

)(

)

(2.2.3a)

,

and
(

)
(

The function

)(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

, for

).

(2.2.3b)

in (2.2.3b) is called generalized network externality function (GNEF).

Remark 2.2.3 We can also consider the domain of (2.2.3b) in terms of market size. Let
be the current market size and

be number of potential consumers in the market. The

relationship between market size and market share for the same single network good can
be expressed by

, where

is the market share as defined before. The differential

equation (2.2.3a) is reduced to
(

)

(

(

)

)(

(

)

).

(2.2.3c)

Remark 2.2.4 If the market share has a natural growth that is described by the VerhulstPearl population dynamic model (Ladde et al, 2012)

(

)(

)

(its

solution is a Sigmoid curve). From (2.2.3a), the network externality value will also have a
(

natural growth, described by

)(

) . In other words, the differential

equation (2.2.3a) is a relative growth rate model (Huxley, 1932; Robert Rosen, 1967 and
Ladde et al, 2012) with respect to the market share and network externality value.
Remark 2.2.5 If we assume

,

,

( )

and,

( )

then the GNEF fulfills the properties of a cumulative distribution function (CDF).
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,

Remark 2.2.6 We further note that there are five and seven parameters in (2.2.2) and
(2.2.3b), respectively. These parameters play an important role in analyzing: planning,
policy and performance aspects of network goods.

2.3 Properties of the Generalized Network Externality Function
In this section, we present the qualitative properties of the GNEF. These properties shed a
light on the historical assumptions (Economide (1996), Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006)) that
are made about the network externality function. In fact, the function determined by
differential equation (2.2.3a) possesses all the specified properties of network externality
function in the literature (Gottinger, (2003), Lin (2008)) in systematic and unified way.
2.3.1 Admissible Market Share: For network goods, the domain of GNEF (2.2.3b) and
(2.2.3c) are

(

)

(

) and (

)

(

), respectively.

2.3.2 Switching Cost: The range of both GNEF (2.2.3b) and (2.2.3c) for the network
externality goods is

(

). The parameter

can be considered as the switching

cost/the minimum threshold for existence of the network goods in the market. The
concept of switching cost is defined by Thompson and Cats-Baril (2002) as “the costs
associated with switching supplier”. For example, in the case of telephone as a network
good, the switching cost includes the efforts needed to inform friends and relatives about
a new telephone number. The operator switching cost is related to learning about how to
use the interface of a new mobile phone from different brands. Moreover, in the case of
electricity as a network good, the cost includes the lost time due to the paperwork
necessary when switching to a new electricity provider. Types of switching costs include:
exit fees, search costs, learning costs, cognitive efforts, emotional costs, equipment costs,
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installation and start-up costs, financial risk, psychological risk and social risk. In short,
the parameter “ ” can be considered as “planning parameter” to enter the network goods.
2.3.3 Monotonicity: The introduction of network externality principle leads to the two
types of following concepts: (i) the positive marginal network externality and (ii) the
negative marginal network externality. From the domain and range of GNEF, we observe
(

that the expressions (
Hence, if

)(

)

)(

)

and (

(

)

(

then

(
)(

)
)

in (2.2.3a) and (2.2.3c) are positive.

). In this case,

is referred to as a positive

marginal network externality function. The network externality value increases as the
is an increasing function on (

market share/size increases, that is,
(

(

)). On the other hand, if

, then

(

)

). In this case,

is referred to as a negative marginal network externality function. Thus, the network
externality function decreases as the market share/size increases, that is,
function on (
process,

)(

(

is a decreasing

)). For both types of marginal network externality

is the monotonic function with the greatest lower bound

and the least upper

bound . See Figure 2.1.

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.1 Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating of (2.2.3b) for (a)
.
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and (b)

In fact, a graphic illustration for fulfilling all properties of function in (2.2.3b) with the
domain between

and

, lower limit

, upper limit

, inflection point (point of

( )), and increasing/decreasing (depending on the sign of ).

diminishing return) (

Remark 2.3.1 Example 2.2.2 and Example 2.2.3 have positive and negative marginal
network externality, respectively.
Remark 2.3.2 From the above discussion, we note that the development of network
externality function in Section 2.2 with

possesses all properties that were outlined

by Lin (2008), in systematic and unified way. Moreover, the types of network goods can
be directly verified by the sign of the first derivative. The first derivative of

in (2.2.3b)

is
(

( )
(

)(

)(

(

)

)

(

)

)

(

)
(

(

)

( )

)

(

)

.

(2.3.1)

)

[

For

(

]

and

, if

then

( )

. In short, the sign of constant of proportionality

, and if

then

represents the types of

network goods.
In order to illustrate the remaining assumptions in Table 2.1, we need to introduce the
following notation and derive some expressions. We define
(
For

and

)(

)

(

)

.

(2.3.2)

, (2.3.1) is reduced to
(

)

(

) .
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(2.3.3)

Thus, the constant of proportionality
when

relates to the speed of change or slope at point

, see detail Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating the role of
,
.

when

2.3.4 Law of Diminishing Return: The law of diminishing return is utilized in almost all
aspects of economics. This concept is also used to study the network goods (Ben-Zion
and Travor, 2006). In the literature, the network externality function is assumed to satisfy
diminishing return assumption together with

( )

. In order to justify the

validity of this property, we need to introduce a couple concepts.
Definition 2.3.1 The Lower-Left Terminal Point (LLTP) is a pair of the greatest lower
bounds of the domain and range of the network externality function. Hence, the LLTP of
GNEF is (

)

(

).

Definition 2.3.2 The Upper-Right Terminal Point (URTP) is a pair of the least upper
bounds of the domain and range of network externality function. Hence, the URTP of
GNEF is (

)

(

).

Let be the reference line connecting the two points, (
is ( )

(

)

, where

) and (

). The equation of

, and it is the slope of the line . Moreover, this

slope is the ratio of the range of network externality with the range of available market
20

share for the network goods. This can be interpreted as the maximum excess network
externality per unit range of the market share. We introduce

as the network externality

index (NEI) of a network goods.
( ))

and (

Proposition 2.3.1 For

(

)

(

1. If | |

, then

( )

( )

2. If | |

, then

( )

( )
( )

Proof From (2.3.2), (2.3.1) is reduced to,

(

When

,

( )

(

) (

)

When

,

( )

(

) (

)

).

)

(

)

(

)

[(

)
(

(

)
)

)

[(

(
(

)

.

]

)

)

[(

,

]

(

)

.

]

For

,if

,then

( )

and if

, then

( )

.

For

,if

,then

( )

and if

, then

( )

.

For

, by the l'Hôpital's rule,
( )

(

) (

)

( )

(

) (

)

[(

)(

[(

)

)

(

(

.

)

)(

]

)

]

.

If

, then

( )

and if

, then

( )

.

If

, then

( )

and if

, then

( )

.

Remark 2.3.3 The byproduct of Proposition 2.3.1 is that the rate of change of GNEF
converges to zero at
fact,

( )

and
and

from the right and left, respectively, whenever | |
( )

. In

.

We further note that depending on the positive or negative marginal network externality
and for | |

, we have corresponding two types of laws of diminishing returns,
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namely, positively and negatively diminishing returns. Moreover, from the above
discussion, the positively and negatively diminishing returns are characterized by
[

(

)(

)

(

)(

)

]{

, for

(2.3.4a)

and

(concave up to concave down)
[

(

)(

)

(

)(

)

]{

, for

and

(2.3.4b)

.

(concave down to concave up)
respectively, where (

( )) is referred as a point of inflection. See Figure 2.1.

Illustration 2.3.1 A law of positively diminishing return in economics states that as a
person increases his/her consumption of a product/good - while keeping the consumption
of other products constant, there is a decline in the marginal utility that person derives
from consuming each additional unit of that product (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009).
The same empirical economics principle is applicable here, when market share increases
- while keeping the other factors constant, there is a decline in the marginal value of
network externality, that is, when market share passes the critical size the second
derivative of network externality function will be less than zero,

( )

;

.

A law of negatively diminishing return can be illustrated, analogously. The Figure 2.1a
further illustrates the concept of positively diminishing return, that is, geometrically, the
point of inflection at which the concavity changes from the concave up to the concave
down. The Figure 2.1b illustrates the feature of negatively diminishing curve, that is, the
point of inflection at which the concavity changes from the concave down to the concave
up.
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2.3.5 Concavity: The shape and concavity of GNEF is determined by its second
derivative. From (2.2.3a), the second derivative of
[

(

)

(

is

( )[

)]

(

( ))

are derived by (

The point of inflection of

( )) (

(

)(

)
)

(

].

)

(2.3.5)

.

The concavity of the GNEF varies depending on its parametric variations. Without loss of
generality, we consider the positive marginal externality function,

. The case

can be imitated, analogously. In the following, we analyze a few particular cases.
Case I: In this case, the constant of proportionality of (2.2.3a) equals to the reciprocal of
the network externality index, (

or

). Under this condition,

in (2.2.3b)

is reduced to
( )

(

)(

( ))

and (

Proposition 2.3.2 For

.

)(

(2.3.6)

)

(

)

(

).

1. If (

)(

)

, then for all ,

( )

and ( )

2. If (

)(

)

, then for all ,

( )

and (

( )) is below the line .

3. If (

)(

)

, then for all ,

( )

and (

( )) is above the line .

Proof Let

(

)(

), and the equation (2.3.6) can be written as

( )
Let

( ).

(

)(
(

)

(

) (

)

)

.

(2.3.7)

and simplify the equation (2.3.7) into
( )

(
(

)(

)

) (

)

(
(

)
) (

(
)
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(

)
) (

)

.

(2.3.8)

( )

( )

(
(

)(

)

) (

)

.

(2.3.9)

From (2.3.5) and (2.3.9), the second derivative of GNEF can be rewritten as
( )

( )
(

)(

)

[ ( )

( )]

( )
(

) (

)

(2.3.10)

.

Hence, from (2.3.9) and (2.3.10),
If

then for all , ( )

( ) and

( )

.

If

then for all , ( )

( ) and

( )

.

If

then for all , ( )

( ) and

( )

.

In this case, the sign of concavity will not change for entire domain; hence the slope of
GNEF is also monotonic. See Figure 2.3a.
Remark 2.3.4 (

)(

)

is equivalent to

which means the initial

excess network externality per used market share equals to the initial deficit network
externality per unused market share.
Case II: In this case (

), for

and

, the GNEF has S and N

shaped graphs, respectively. See Figure 2.3b.

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.3 Sketches of the shape of GNEF, illustrating the role of
(hence
)
,
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. (a)
, and (b)
.

Based on Table 2.1, there are three assumptions about the shape of network externality
function, namely linear, concave and convex functions. The GNEF’s shape is adjustable
to fit all these assumptions. Hence, we can say that each assumption is a special case of
GNEF, see Figure 2.3a. Moreover, the GNEF is able to provide a monotonic S-shape and
N-shape function, see Figure 2.3b.
Example 2.3.1 The example of an N-shaped network externality function is the product
that develops itself when the network size reaches a certain level. The smartphones, for
example, has few applications in the early in which diminishing concept in marginal
network externality is applied. Later, when network size increases, there are more
developers creating many new applications. At this point, the marginal network
externality is no longer diminishing, but exponentially increasing.

2.4 Applications: Planning, Policy and Performance
In this section, we analyze the effects due to parametric variations on the network
externality process and its value. The presented results provide a glimpse of the role and
scope of parametric variations as control mechanisms/strategies for the planning, policy
and performance regarding network goods/services/information/labor/entity.
2.4.1 From the properties of

described in Section 2.3, it is obvious that the dynamic

models (2.2.3a) and (2.2.3c) of network externality process fulfill all the existing
assumptions used in the literature, Gottinger (2003), Lin (2008), Ben-Zion and
Tavor(2006).
2.4.2 The mathematical description of network externality process provides the
foundation and the basis for the parametric sensitivity analysis of GNEF. The dynamic
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nature of the network externality process provides the parametric dependence. The
underlying parameters can be characterized and decomposed into different classes of
parameters depending on the planning, policy and performance of the network externality
goods/entity. In short, the domain of parameters can be decomposed into sub-domains
regarding the planning, policy and performance strategies.
2.4.3 The policy makers are the persons who set the plans pursed by the firm or
government objectives. The developed plans depend on the estimator’s estimates from
the model. The firm managers have the common objective to have high network
externality value or high market share. From the discussion 2.3.2 and the switching cost
in Section 2.3, the parameter “ ” (lower limit of network externality) is a “planning
parameter”. For

and

, when parameter “ ” increases, while keeping the

other parameters constant, the network externality value increases for lower market share
and decreases for the higher market share. Similar interpretation can be given for the
other parameters,

and . See Table 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.

2.4.4 From Proposition 2.3.2, and its condition,

indicates the shape of

GNEF. Hence, the relationship between the class of parameters
region of parameters that have the equivalent shape. See Figure 2.4a-f.
For

,


If

, then the shape of GNEF is shown as Figure 2.3a;



If

, then the GNEF has S-shape shown as Figure 2.3b;



If

, then the GNEF has N-shape shown in Figure 2.3b.
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and

creates the

Hence, the policy makers can employ these regions to justify the shape of GNEF as they
want. Effects of these parameters can be utilized by the policy makers to manage the
network goods. The policies are based on the ultimate goal(s) of firm/government.
2.4.5 From Section 2.3, we showed that parameters
parameters of GNEF, parameter

represent the boundary

represents its shape, and parameters

represent its

location. The policy makers of a firm can control certain parameters on the basis of the
suitable policies to accomplish their objectives. If the policy makers can control
. For the point (

) under

the higher rate of change. For the point (

) above

they can control the rate of change at initial point
reference line, the higher
reference line, the lower

and ,

|

the higher rate of change. That is, the policy maker can

project firm’s growth by adjusting the initial market share. For the small firm, the lower
initial market share has higher growth rate. For the large firm, the higher initial market
share has higher growth rate. For more graphic representations, see Table 2.6 .
2.4.6 From the sign of , we have either network externality function increasing or
decreasing. However, this phenomenon can be interrupted by incorporating the discrete
time intervention process (Ladde (2005), Korzeniowski and Ladde (2010)). In the
modeling of network externality process, this intervention idea is indeed motivated by the
overall policy of network/users or provider. In fact, the idea of intervention maintains
competitive/cooperative behavior of the comparable network goods. This indeed avoids
monopoly of a market of network goods/service/information. Currently, this work is at
the planning stage.
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Table 2.2 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various

when

| |

| |

Table 2.3 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various

| |

| |
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when

Table 2.4 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various

when

| |

| |

Table 2.5 Effect of a parameter “ ” to the GNEF’s shape at various

| |

| |
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when

Table 2.6 Effect of the initial parameter
(

(

)

(

)

(

)

to the GNEF’s shape at various

) under reference line “ ”
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(

when

) above reference line “ ”

(a) “ ” parameter

(b) “ ” parameter

(c) “ ” parameter

(d) “ ” parameter

(e) “

” parameter

(f) “

Figure 2.4 The control region of various parameters
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” parameter

2.5 Conclusions
2.5.1 After careful review and evaluation of the network externality literature, we
formally developed several ideas, notably, network externality process and network
goods. By using these ideas, we formulated the Principle of Network Externality. The
introduced principle provides a quantitative description of the concept of network
externality as the dynamic process with respect to a market share/size.
2.5.2 The presented dynamic description of network externality process provides a
systematic way of analyzing its well-known and well recognized properties in a unified
way. In fact, it provides a sufficient condition to validate existing assumptions in the
literature, Gottinger (2003), Lin (2008), Ben-Zion and Tavor (2006). This extends the
existing ideas in a unified and coherent manner.
2.5.3 In general, the network externality is considered to have positive marginal network
externality;

however,

we

have

shown

that

for

some

types

of

network

goods/needs/deficiencies/labor/education, the network externality has negative effects.
For example the users of rare item market will lost their specialty, when the market size
increases. In short, the marginal of network externality function is not only positive but
also can be negative, depending on types of network goods.
2.5.4 The most significant contribution of the network externality process is that it
provides the sufficient conditions for the existing assumptions regarding the network
externality function. Moreover, conditions depend on the parameters, this parameter
dependence of model provides mechanism to make the policy to meet performance goal
of the network goods.
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CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
GENERALIZED NETWORK EXTERNALITY FUNCTION

In this chapter, we utilize the generalized network externality function (GNEF) in
Chapter 2 to the real world data. We define the two normalized concepts. We use
statistical techniques to estimate the parameters in GNEF of banking asset model.

3.1 Introduction
In the following, we provide an empirical study to illustrate the usefulness of GNEF.
Unfortunately, we are unable to find an explicit data set with regard to a market share of a
good and its externality value. But in the search of a data set, We were able to find two
types of banking data sets from the central bank of the United States of America (the
Federal Reserve or simply "the Fed") (http://www.federalreserve.gov/default.htm).
Moreover, the data sets are with respect to the weekly banking deposit and asset of the
commercial banks in the USA from the January 2008 to January 2010. The sketches of
the raw data sets suggest that both data sets have Sigmoid shape curve representation.
Figure 3.1a and Figure 3.1b are the US weekly banking asset and deposit (US dollar
billion), from Jan 2008 – Jan 2010, respectively. The individual data is modeled in
Section 3.2. The US banking deposit treated as the market share by normalization is
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discussed in Section 3.3. The GNEF for two banking data sets are developed in Section
3.4.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1 Plot of Weekly US banking (a) asset and (b) deposit ($US billion) from
January 2008 through January 2010.

3.2 Statistical Modeling of US Banking Asset and Deposit
In this section, the statistical studies of the given data sets are summarized. Moreover, by
utilizing the statistical results, we briefly outline the dynamic modeling and parameter
estimation of both data sets. From Figure 3.1, we can use the Sigmoid function to fit
them. The brief discussion is as follow. Let
US Banking Asset

US Banking Deposit.

(3.2.1)

From the plots in Figures 3.1, we conclude that the US banking asset and deposit data
sets possess the following deterministic dynamic models:
(

)(

)

,

(3.2.2)

(

)(

) t,

(3.2.3)

and

respectively, where for

,

and

are positive parameters.

Moreover, the solutions corresponding to (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) are
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(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(3.2.4)

and

(

where

(

)

)

(

and

,

)

(3.2.5)
(

)

.

We apply the Newton-Rahpson Method (Seber and Wild (1989)) to estimate the
parameters

and

for

in (3.2.4) and (3.2.5). The statistical summary

is outlined in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Estimated parameters of US banking asset and deposit model
Dynamic Model
Lower Limit:
(Standard Error)
Upper Limit:
(Standard Error)
Location Parameter:
(Standard Error)
Constant of Proportionality:
(Standard Error)
Residual Sum of
Square: RSS
Coefficient of
Determination::

US Banking
Asset Model
11.0036
(1.48x10-2)
12.0311
(1.00x10-2)
2.607x10-4
(1.75x10-4)
0.2067
(1.87x10-2)

US Banking
Deposit Model
11.4909
(1.75x10-2)
13.2204
(1.41x10-2)
0.0045
(1.11x10-3)
0.0664
(3.68x10-3)

0.4882

0.4938

0.9773

0.9906

Remark 3.2.1 The results of the data fitting in Table 3.1 includes four parameters, their
standard deviations in parenthesis, residual sum of square
coefficient of determination
very low RSS (about zero) and high

∑ (

̂)

∑ (

̅)

∑ (

̂) and

are also included. Both models have

(about one). The variation of US banking asset

and US banking deposit can be explained by Sigmoid function 97.73% and 99.06%,
respectively. We note that the standard errors in parenthesis corresponding to parameters
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are recorded in Table 3.1. The Residual standard error (RSE) for the US Banking asset
model is 0.0695 with 101 degrees of freedom. It needs 18 iterations for the convergence.
In the case of US banking deposit model, the residual standard error (RSE) is 0.0699 with
101 degrees of freedom. It needs 14 iterations to establish the convergence.
Remark 3.2.2 By observing the qualitative nature of the above cited data sets, we
construct the data sets, and introduce various types of normalized US banking deposit
models. The developed models will be utilized to introduce the US banking asset as
network externality for the banking industry.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.2 Curve fitting of the US banking (a) asset and (b) deposit

3.3 Normalized US Banking Deposit Models
To justify the usage of the US banking asset and deposit as the network externality and
financial market share, respectively, we need to analyze the asset as the network
externality value and the banking deposit as the market share. Because the domain of
in (3.2.3) is between zero and one,

(

), we need to modify the data values of US

banking deposit model (USBD Model) and develop normalized banking deposit models.
In particular, we need an upper limit for banking deposit. In the absence of a prior
knowledge of absolute least upper bound of US banking deposit, we am forced to
36

normalize the given data set and also need to develop the dynamic model for normalized
US banking deposit. As a result of this, based on different normalized banking deposit
procedure, we have developed two models.
3.3.1 Normalized US Banking Deposit Model (USBD Model) – I
We normalize the scale of banking deposit

to have the lower and upper limits. We

define the excess US banking deposit as the difference between the current US banking
deposit

and its lower limit, that is,

. A theoretical overall excess US banking

deposit is defined as the difference between the upper and lower limit of banking deposit,
that is

. Thus, the normalized banking deposit is defined by:
(

or

)

.

(3.3.1)

After the normalization of banking deposit, the dynamic equation (3.2.3) is reduced to:
(

)

(

) .

(3.3.2)

.

(3.3.3)

Its solution is,
(
where

(

)

)
(

)

(

)

. Now in the dynamic equation in (3.3.2), its

upper limit is one and lower limit is zero. Theoretically, the normalized banking deposit
must be between zero and one. Unfortunately, the parameters

and

are

unknown. Therefore, we use the estimators ̂ and ̂ of US banking deposit model from
Table 3.1 in (3.3.1).
Remark 3.3.1 The presented normalization process in (3.3.1) lost some data points. This
is due to the fact that, we used the estimators ̂ and ̂ instead of the true parameters. In
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order to minimize the loss of data points, we introduce another normalization method to
obtain the concept of market share. This is described below.
3.3.2 Normalized US Banking Deposit Model (USBD Model) – II
In view of Remark 3.3.1, we consider the banking deposit as a part of portfolio, and then
we calculate the transform data set by comparing the banking deposit to the US average
gross investment (USAGI). The US average gross investment from January 2008 through
January 2010 is 18.82 billion US dollars (http://www.federalreserve.gov/default.htm).
We assume that USAGI is upper limit for the US banking deposit. Under this assumption,
we define the following transformation to normalize the US banking deposit as follow:
.

(3.3.4)

Now, by following the argument used in the US banking deposit model (USBD Model) –
I, we have the dynamic model for the normalized US banking deposit model as:
(

)(

)

.

(3.3.5)

Its solution is,
(
where

(

(3.3.5), its upper limit is

)

)

,

(

(3.3.6)

)

and lower limit is

. Now in the dynamic equation in
.

3.4 US Banking Asset Network Externality Models
By employing our knowledge in the theory of relative growth, J. Huxley (1932) and
Robert Rosen (1967) and following the definition of network externality, we define the
relative growth of the US banking asset, , with respect to the normalized US banking
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deposit. Thus, we conclude that the US banking asset can be considered as a function of
US banking deposit. This idea naturally illustrates that the US banking asset as network
externality process with respect to the banking deposit as a financial market share. As the
result of this, we utilize two normalized USBD models to develop corresponding
dynamic models for the US banking asset as the network externality process. Therefore,
we have two dynamic models for the network externality for the US banking asset.
From the Deterministic US banking asset model in Section 3.2, the relative growth model
of

in (3.2.2) with respect to two normalized US banking deposit models described by

(3.3.1)-(3.3.2) and (3.3.4)-(3.3.5) are as follow:
(
(

(

respectively, where

)(

)

)

(

)

(

)(

)

)(

and

,

(3.4.1a)
,

)

(3.4.1b)

are as defined before. These two dynamic

models are dynamic models of network externality of the US banking asset with respect
to the normalized US banking deposit as the financial market share. These differential
equations are exactly similar to the differential in (2.2.3b). Therefore, the comparison of
parameters in (2.2.3b) with parameters in (3.4.1a-b) is as follow:
and

(

and

,

(3.4.2a)

)

,

(3.4.2b)

respectively. Thus, all parameters above can be estimate by the product of Table 3.1 and
the plots are shown in Figure 3.3.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3 Curve fitting of USBANE: indirect approach (a) Model-I (b) Model-II
The summary estimation of two US banking asset network externality models (USBANE
Model) is based on the estimated parameters in Table 3.1 in the contest of the parameters
of normalized USBD models as the financial market share.
Table 3.2 Estimated parameters of USBANE Models with USBD Market Share
USBANE
Lower Limit:
Upper Limit:
Minimum Share:
Maximum Share :
Constant of Proportionality:
Sample Size
Residual Sum of
Square: RSS

Model I
11.0036
12.0311
0
1
0.1857
85

Model II
11.0036
12.0311
0.6106
0.7025
0.0171
105

0.6242

0.4537

3.5 Model Diagnostics
The underlying nonlinear regression model (Ritz and Streibig, 2008) are:
1. Correct mean function
2. Variance homogeneity (homoscedasticity)
3. Normally distribution measurement errors
4. Mutually independent measurement errors
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Violation of any one of the above assumptions could result in bias estimators and/or
distort standard errors. In this subsection, we examine model diagnostic of nonlinear least
square analysis of US banking asset and deposit models, (3.2.4) and (3.2.5), respectively.
This is essential to analyze their behaviors of the residual error independency,
homogeneity and normality under the application of Newton-Raphson method. We
consider some important plots, homogeneity test and normality test.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.4 Plot of residuals vs time of (a) asset, and (b) deposit models
Figure 3.4 show the residuals plot of asset and deposit models. Thus, we conclude that
their residuals are homoscedasticity with respect to time.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.5 Plot of standardized residuals vs fitted value of (a) asset, and (b) deposit
models
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Figure 3.5 exhibit the plot of standardized residuals vs the fitted values of asset and
deposit models. These standardized residual error plots demonstrate that there is no linear
correlation. This suggests that the residual errors exhibit the homogeneity. This assertion
will be further examined by the application of statistical test for homogeneity as
described below.
Homogeneity Test: From residual plots, one can easily draw a conclusion about the
homogeneity of residual errors. However, we apply the homogeneity test developed by
Endrenyi and Kwong (1981) to our residual errors of asset and deposit models. The brief
description of the test is as follow: First, we ﬁt the model, and then order the residuals as
̂(

)

ﬁrst

̂(

)

̂( ) . Secondly, we compute the ratio of the last

squared residuals. The suggestion for

is

squared residuals to the

. Under these considerations, the

homogeneity test is as follow:
( )

vs

∑

̂( )
∑

The

( )

̂( )

statistics and its

Table 3.3 Homogeneity test:

of the test are recorded in Table 3.3.
statistics and p-values

Homogeneity test

From the Table 3.3, the

Asset Model
0.7459
0.2256
of two models are bigger than

Deposit Model
1.0100
0.5102
. This shows

that there is no signiﬁcant evidence to reject the homogeneity of their residuals at the
signiﬁcance level 0.05.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.6 QQ Plot of standardized residuals of (a) asset, and (b) deposit model
Figure 3.6 show the QQ plots of the standardized residual errors of asset and deposit
models. There is slightly different from straight line. We need further examine the
normality of standardized residual errors by utilizing the histogram. The results are as
follow.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.7 Histogram of standardized residuals of (a) asset, and (b) deposit model
Figure 3.7 exhibit that histogram of the standardized residual errors of deposit model is
more normal shape than asset model. In addition to this, we utilize the statistical
normality test developed by Shapiro and Wilk (2008) and this test is as described below.
Normality Test: For this test, the null and alternative hypotheses are:
The random sample,

, is drawn from normally distributed population

The random sample,

, is not drawn from normally distributed population
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∑

We compute
(

)

∑

()

( ()

(

)

̅)

where

, where

()

is order statistic, ̅ is the sample mean.

(

)

are the expected values of the order statistics of independent and identically
distributed random variables sample from the standard normal distribution and

is the

covariance matrix of those order statistics.
The

statistics and its

Table 3.4 Normality test:

of the test are recorded in Table 3.4
statistics and p-values

Normality Test

From the Table 3.4, their

Asset Model
0.9783
0.0819
are bigger than

Deposit Model
0.9814
0.1489
. This suggests that there

is no signiﬁcant evidence to reject the normality of their residuals at the signiﬁcance level
0.05. In summary, from the above statistical study, we conclude that the residuals exhibit
independency, homogeneity and normality of Asset and Deposit models.

3.6 Conclusions
We utilize the generalized network externality function (GNEF) in Chapter 2 to the real
world data set. In the banking industry, we consider the banking asset as the network
externality value and banking deposit as the market share. The data sets are with respect
to the weekly banking deposit and asset of the commercial banks in the USA from the
January 2008 to January 2010. There are two methods to treat banking deposit as market
share, marking the minimum/maximum share and portfolio methods. From the sketches
of banking asset and deposit, it suggests that both data sets have Sigmoid shape curve.
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Then their relative growth is the same as (2.2.3a) in Chapter 2 which leads to GNEF
(2.2.3b). Consequently, there are also two US banking asset network externality models.
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CHAPTER 4
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATION FOR NETWORK GOODS

In this chapter, we consider a utility function that is influenced by the value of network
externality function at the consumer’s expected market size/share. Using this utility
function, a market share adjustment function is introduced and is utilized to develop
dynamic models of existing rational and static expectation processes. In addition, the role
and scope of dynamic models of market share adjustment process are extended to the
well-known adaptive expectation and its extension processes. The properties of
equilibrium states of dynamic models are investigated which include location, stability,
oscillation and the initial states in systematic and unified way. The most significant
byproduct of presented results is that the properties of equilibrium states depend on the
type of consumer expectation of a network good and the parameters of dynamic market
share adjustment processes.

4.1 Introduction
With regard to network goods, the utility function is known to be affected by the market
size/share (Shy, 2001). The fundamental concept of network externality is that consumers
gain more benefit when more consumers consume the same good. Hence, the market
size/share is a factor that affects the consumer’s decision to adopt a network good. In
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practice, consumers do not have information about the actual market size/share. In view
of this, consumers need to speculate their expected market size/share.
It is well-known (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) that in the network goods economy, the idea of
dependence of consumer surplus function on the value of network externality function at
the consumer’s expected market size/share was introduced. Moreover, under the fulfilled
expectation assumption, the rational equilibrium is characterized for compatible products.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) ideas and results are extended by Easley and Kleinberg (2010)
to consumer demand goods and Amir and Lazzati (2011) to industry performance.
Furthermore, under the rational expectation assumption, the effects of the market
structure of the equilibrium states are analyzed.
In this work, we extend the idea of Katz and Shapiro (1985) to modify the utility function
that depends on a value of network externality function at an expected market size/share
at a real time . The consumer’s expected market size/share is speculated, and it is based
on either the current or the past market share, or the combination of the current and past
market share. Instead of directly using properties of modified utility function, we utilize
the modified function to introduce a concept of market share adjustment function.
Employing the market share adjustment function, we develop mathematical models
corresponding to consumer rational, static, and current and lagged adaptive expectations
in a systematic and unified way. Furthermore, we establish the existence and location of
equilibrium states and study the qualitative properties of equilibrium states in a
systematic way. The qualitative properties (stability and oscillation) are analyzed in the
context of the parameters of dynamic systems. In fact, the parameters of the dynamic
systems are decomposed into subsets that are characterized by the stability and oscillatory
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regions. Moreover, the presented dynamic model formation provides a suitable design to
develop an agent-based simulation model (Paothong, 2013).
In short, the chapter is organized as follows. By introducing a market share adjustment
function, dynamic models for rational and static expectation processes are developed in
Section 4.2. In addition, sufficient conditions are given to exhibit the existence of
corresponding rational and static equilibrium states. In Section 4.3, by considering a
market share adjustment function in the context of adaptive expectations, dynamic
models of current and lagged adaptive expectation processes are developed. Furthermore,
it is shown the static equilibrium states are invariant under the current and lagged
adaptive expectation processes. In Section 4.4, the sufficient conditions are given to
establish the qualitative properties (stability and oscillatory) of dynamic systems. We
note that the stability conditions are in terms of parameters of dynamic systems. In
Section 4.5, by extending the domain of the speed of adjustment parameter, we develop
the results parallel to the results of Section 4.4. Moreover, we decompose the domain of
dynamic systems and the speed of adjustment parameters into regions according to
qualitative properties of dynamic systems. In Section 4.6, by using simulations, we
exhibit the influence of the initial states on the solution paths of dynamic models under
static, current and lagged adaptive expectation processes.

4.2 Dynamic Models of Rational and Static Expectation Processes
We analyze an underlying network good model in discrete time,

{

}, and all

variables are time varying or time invariant. For each , a utility function is composed of
the consumer’s individual preference, the price of the network good and the value of
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network externality function at a consumer’s expected market size/share. In this study,
for simplicity, we treat the market size as the market share,
[

between zero and one,
(
where

]. Hence,
)

(

)

is the consumer’s individual preference;

share at time ;

, that is, it has value

(4.2.1)
is the consumer’s expected market

is the price of the network good and

is the generalized network

externality function (GNEF) (Paothong and Ladde, 2012). We further make two
assumptions:
1. The individual preference
function,

is distributed according to a cumulative distribution

(cdf) with a probability density function,

(pdf).

2. Each consumer has an identical expectation type and network externality
function.
Following the argument used by Katz and Shapiro (1985), we conclude that the consumer
joins the network whenever his/her utility is greater than zero, that is,
; otherwise he/she stays out of the network market. Let

(

)

be the individual preference

level at which the consumer is indifferent between joining and staying out of the network
(

market, that is,

)

. This interpretation motivates us to introduce a concept

of a market share adjustment function. It is defined by
∫
where

, ,

( )
and

( )
are defined in (4.2.1),

(

(

and

are defined in assumption 1.
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))

(

)

(4.2.2)

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.1 Sketches of (a) GNEF and (b) pdf of consumer’s individual preference.
Remark 4.2.1 We observe that the market share is illustrated by the shaded area under
[

in Figure 4.1b. The function

]

[

] in (4.2.2) is continuous. Since

and

are

pdf and network externality functions, respectively, the first derivative of the function
is
(
Thus, the function

)

( ) (

is increasing on [

)

(4.2.3)

]. Moreover, from (4.2.2), the mathematical

description of an equilibrium state of network market share at a time is determined by
(

). Clearly, the existence of the equilibrium states is determined by the solution

of the algebraic equation (4.2.2).
Proposition 4.2.1 ( )

, if and only if

.

Proof From (4.2.2), and the increasing property of , for ( )
( (

))

(

, we have

)

This implies that
(

)

This completes the proof of “if” part. The proof of the “only if” part follows by imitating
the argument in the reverse order.
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Proposition 4.2.2 If

( )

(4.2.2) has a fixed point, ̅

( ̅).

[

Proof. For

( ), then the function

] and the increasing property of functions
( )

(

( ))
(

( ))

(
)

and , we have
( )

(

( )

(

( )

.

defined in

( ))

),

and

Since

and

the interval [
( )

are continuous functions,
]. Define ( )

and ( )

(1985), there exists ̅ (

is a real-valued continuous function defined on

( )

. Then,

is also continuous function with

. Therefore, by application of Theorem 1.6.1 of Ladde et al
) such that ( ̅)

( ̅).

. Hence, ̅

Remark 4.2.2 From the economists’ view, a straight forward interpretation of
Proposition 4.2.2 is as follows. If the price satisfies the condition,
all consumers join the network with their expected market share, and hence,
all

, that is, ̅

( ̅)

( ), then
for

. On the other hand, if the price satisfies the condition,

( ), then all consumers leave the network with their expected market
share, and hence,

for all

, that is, ̅

( ̅)

.

We note that the properties of equilibrium states are affected by the nature of the function
and the type of consumer expectation. In the following subsections, we outline two
well-known expectations for a network good.
4.2.1 Rational Expectation (RE)
The rational expectation is defined as the optimal forecast. All consumers use all
available information to form their expectations. We remark that RE was originally
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introduced by John F. Muth (1961). Also, in a network good, Katz and Shapiro (1985)
used RE in their work, and the equilibrium state is called the fulfilled expectation
equilibrium. In this scenario, all consumers have perfect foresight about the market share,
. Consequently, from (4.2.2), a dynamic model of RE process satisfies the
following discrete time dynamic iterative adjustment process,
( ), for

(4.2.4)

In this case, the equilibrium state(s) is(are) the point(s) of intersection(s) of function
and the line with slope of one. It is well-known in the fixed-point theory that the
solution(s) of (4.2.4) is(are) called the fixed point(s) of the function . Obviously, the
existence of fixed points of

depends on its analytic properties (Proposition 4.2.2).

When consumers have a RE for a network good, the multiple fixed points are commonly
discussed. Furthermore, the discussion of these equilibrium states can be found in Amir
and Lazzati (2011), Easley and Kleinberg (2010) and Katz and Shapiro (1985). In
general, there are two disadvantages for the RE scenario. First, it is a very restrictive
assumption on the consumer expectation. It implies that all consumers have perfect
information about market equilibrium. Second, it is an instantaneous adjustment process.
Therefore, it is a completely static process. The equilibrium states of RE process depend
on the parametric variation in algebraic equation (4.2.4) (Proposition 4.2.2).
(

Illustration 4.2.1 Let us consider a particular example in which

), and

is a generalized network externality function in Chapter 2 (Paothong and Ladde, 2012)
with

and

We observe that
( )

,
(

,

( )

)

and

, that is, (
( )

)

. In this simple case,

. From Proposition 4.2.2, the appropriate price range is
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.

.

For this concrete example, if
̅

and ̅
and

. We note that

(̅ )

respectively, but ̅

, there are three equilibrium states at ̅
(̅ )

,

(̅ )

. ̅ and ̅ are lower and upper stable states,

is unstable. For

stable equilibrium state at ̅

and
and ̅

, there corresponds one
, respectively. This suggests that

the price level affects the location and number of equilibrium states. Moreover, as the
price increases, the function

moves downward,

,

(

(

))

. See Figure 4.2.

(a)
Figure 4.2 Sketches of (a) GNEF,

(b)
(

)

(c)
; (b) pdf of the consumer’s

( ), (c) function , and location(s) of equilibrium
individual preference
states that are determined by price = 2.25, 2.5 and 2.75 for Illustration 4.2.1.
4.2.2 Static Expectation
To study the adjustment process in the neighborhood of the equilibrium state, the
simplest common type of consumer expectation, namely static (or naive) expectation, is
employed. Consumers have asymmetric information in time, and they expect no change
for the present time. In this case, all consumers use the immediate past actual market
share as their present expectation,

. Consequently, from (4.2.2), a dynamic
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model of SE process is determined by the first order nonlinear difference equation that
describes a dynamic model of the market share adjustment process,
( ), ( )
In this case, the sequence { }

is a solution path of discrete time dynamic adjustment
). The equilibrium states (steady states: ( ̅)

(

process (4.2.5), where

(4.2.5)

̅)

of (4.2.5) are determined by Proposition 4.2.2. The assumption of a single unit time lag is
realistic, and is suitable to derive an empirically tractable strategy to identify the
adjustment process for the equilibrium sates.
Illustration 4.2.2 We illustrate the stability conditions of an equilibrium state by the
graphical method. Suppose
(

),

(

is the initial market share. For

) and so on. In this method, we track the initial state (

move vertically until we reach the curve to (
reach (

in (4.2.5), clearly,

)

) and

, then move horizontally until we

) and so on until we reach the equilibrium state ̅. See Figure 4.3a. Using

the Illustration 4.2.1, the graphical method tells us that the adjustment process will
( ̅)

converge to two stable equilibrium states for which
unstable equilibrium state for which
and

( ̅)

(̅ )

equilibrium states, respectively, but ̅

. Since,

, ̅ and ̅

; and diverge from an

(̅ )

,

(̅ )

are the lower and upper stable

is unstable equilibrium state. The detailed

analytic stability conditions will be discussed in Section 4.4. See Figure 4.3b.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.3 (a) Adjustment process of stable equilibrium state: graphical method; and (b)
shows three equilibrium states, two stable and one unstable.
Remark 4.2.3 If all consumers follow the SE process with

̅, then the market share

adjustment function has a fixed point at ̅. Hence, the solution of (4.2.4) is the long run
solution of equation (4.2.5). Moreover, since
Ladde, 2012), from (4.2.3),

is an increasing function (Paothong and

is also an increasing function. Thus, there is no chaotic

situation for this model (Chiarella, 1988).

4.3 Dynamic Models of Adaptive Expectation Processes
In this section, we utilize the well-known adaptive expectation (AE) to form a consumer
expectation of market share. The AE is one of the backward-looking expectations. More
precisely, the future (present) expectation of an endogenous variable is directly adjusted
by the weighted mean of its current (immediate past) actual value and either the current
or the past expected value. Thus, in this study, we classify the AE into two simple
categories.
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4.3.1 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE)
In this traditional adaptive expectation (Chow, 2011) all consumers speculate the future
(present) market share by the weighted sum of the current (immediate past) expectation
and the current (immediate past) actual market share, that is,
(
where

)

[

(

)

],

(4.3.1)

is a speed of adjustment in which SE process is a special case of CAE

process (

). The “ω” measures the significance of

and

. If

, then the

consumer is very conservative. From (4.3.1) and (4.2.2), a dynamic model of CAE
process is described by the following first order nonlinear difference equation,
(

)

( )

( ), ( )

.

(4.3.2)

Of course, by following the argument used in the SE process, the existences of
equilibrium states are determined by (4.3.2).
Proposition 4.3.1 From the dynamic model (4.3.2) of the CAE process, we have
a)

and

b)

( )

c) If

have the same equilibrium states;
is scalar multiple of ( )

;

is parallel to the line with slope one, then

is parallel to ;

d) If the speed of adjustment decreases (increase),

is rotated clockwise (anti-

clockwise) toward the line around equilibrium states.
Proof of (a): The equilibrium states of dynamic CAE process are determined by
̅ . This implies ̅
implies

( ̅)

(

̅. Thus,

)̅
( ̅)

( ̅) . Hence,
̅ if and only if ( ̅)

of statement (a).
Proof of (b): From the definition of

( ), we have,
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( ̅)

̅ . Conversely,

( ̅)
( ̅)

̅

̅. This establishes the validity

( )

[ ( )

This establishes the statement (b), that is,

]

(4.3.3)

( )

is a scalar multiple of ( )

.

Proof of (c): From (4.3.3), and applying the concept of implicit differentiation, we get
(
Hence,

)

(4.3.4)

.

Proof of (d): From (4.3.4) we have,

. Hence, if

clockwise around equilibrium state whenever
then

, then

is rotated

decreases. On the other hand, if

is rotated counterclockwise around equilibrium state whenever

squeezes toward 45 degree line around equilibrium states whenever

,

decreases. Thus,
decreases.

Remark 4.3.1 The weighted sum of CAE process (4.3.1) and its dynamic model (4.3.2)
can be modified to
(

)

[

(

)

]

and
(

) ( )

( ), ( )

,

respectively. The comments and Proposition 4.3.1 remain valid with regard to this
modified CAE process.
4.3.2 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE)
We modify an assumption of the CAE. Here, all consumers use the weighted sum of the
current expected market share and the immediate past actual market share to adjust their
immediate future market share as
(

)

[

(
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)

],

(4.3.5)

where

is the speed of adjustment defined in (4.3.1). Hence, the dynamic of adjustment

process in the context of (4.2.2) and (4.3.5) is described by the second order nonlinear
difference equation as
(

)

(

)

(

), ( )

.

(4.3.6)

Remark 4.3.2 The weighted sum of LAE process (4.3.5) and its dynamic model (4.3.6)
can be modified to
(

)

[

(

)

]

and
(

) (

)

(

), ( )

,

respectively.
Remark 4.3.3 We observe that the equilibrium states of LAE process are the same as
( ̅). In other words, the existence of equilibrium states

CAE, SE and RE processes, ̅

is independent of type of consumer expectations. Of course, the existence of equilibrium
states depends on the distribution of consumer preference random variable, price
parameter of network good and the network externality function of a network good.
Table 4.1 Meaning and equilibrium condition of all processes
Process
RE
SE

Meaning

(
CAE
LAE

)
or

(

Equilibrium Condition
( ̅)
̅
( ̅)
̅

)
or
(

(

̅

)
)
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̅

( ̅)
( ̅ ̅)

( ̅)
( ̅)

4.4 Stability
In this section, we study the analytic stability conditions of equilibrium states of four
types of expectations. For easy reference, we state a few basic definitions of stability
concepts.
1. An equilibrium state, ̅, is called Lyapunov stable or locally uniformly stable
to ̅, then

(LUS), if for any closed enough initial states

, there exist ( )

all time, that is, for each
|

̅|

for all

stays close to ̅ for

such that |

̅|

.

2. A Lyapunov stable equilibrium state is called locally uniformly asymptotically
stable (LUAS), if for any closed enough initial states
such that |

to ̅, that is, there exist

to ̅, then

̅|

converges
̅.

3. A Lyapunov stable equilibrium state is called globally uniformly stable (GUS), if
for any initial states
, there exist ( )

, then

stays close to ̅ for all time, that is, for each

such that |

|

̅|

̅|

for all

.

4. A Lyapunov stable equilibrium state is called globally uniformly asymptotically
stable (GUAS), if for any initial states
,

, then

converges to ̅. That is, for all

̅.

Now, we are ready to present the stability conditions for each discrete time iterative
processes with regard to each types of expectation. We recall that the RE process is
absolutely static.
4.4.1 Static Expectation (SE)
The stability of the equilibrium state of SE process depends on the analytic properties of
.
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Proposition 4.4.1 We assume that all consumers have static expectation. Further, we
assume that the hypothesis of Proposition 4.2.2 is satisfied. Let
(

̅))

and

(

(̅

]∫

[

̅))

[

]∫

(̅

, where ̅ is the equilibrium state

of (4.2.5).
, then ̅ is GUAS equilibrium state,

a) If

(

(̅

b) If ∫

̅))

, then ̅ is GUS equilibrium state,

, then ̅ is unstable equilibrium state.

c) If

Proof of (a): Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.2.5). For any

[

] and the

generalized mean-value theorem (Ladde et al (1985)), we have
( )

( ̅)

(

̅) ∫

(

(̅

̅))

.

(4.4.1)

From (4.2.3) and (4.4.1), we have
| ( )

( ̅)|

|

[

̅| for

].

(4.4.2)

From Proposition 4.2.2, (4.2.5) and (4.4.2), we have
|
|

By setting

|

̅|
̅|,

|

̅|
̅|, (4.4.3) is reduced to

,
For some

(4.4.3)

.

(4.4.4)

, applying the comparison theorem (Ladde and Sambandham, 1985) to

(4.4.4), we get
(4.4.5)

,
where

is the solution process of the following comparison iterative process
,

.

Thus,
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(4.4.6)

|
|

whenever

|

̅|

̅|,

(4.4.7)

̅| . From (4.4.7) and the assumption that
|

conclude that ̅ is Lyapunov stable equilibrium state. Moreover,
[

all

, we
̅|

, for

|

̅|,

]. This exhibits the GUAS property of ̅.

for all . Hence, |

|

̅|

(

(̅

Proof of (b): From (4.1), and ∫

, then |

̅))

̅|

̅|. In view of this, it is obvious that ̅ is a GUS

equilibrium state.
Proof of (c): Imitating the proof of (a), we have
|
Under the condition

|

̅|

̅|.

(4.4.8)

, and following the similar argument used in (a), we conclude

that ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state.
Corollary 4.4.1 We assume that all assumptions of Proposition 4.4.1 remain valid,
except statements (a) and (c) are replaced by:
a) If

( ̅)

, then ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state,

b) If

( ̅)

, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state,

where

is continuously differentiable at ̅.

Proof of (a): Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.2.5). We suppose that
Because of the continuity of
such that

( )

for all

,

( )
[

for all

], we have ̅

( ̅)|

̅

.

)

,

. In view of the convexity of an open interval,
(

̅)

. Hence,

. From this and (4.4.1), we have
| ( )

(̅

at ̅, there exists an interval

( ̅)

( )|

̅|, for

.

Imitating the proof of Proposition 4.4.1(a), we conclude that
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(̅

(

̅))

( )

|
From (4.4.9), for each
hence |

̅|

( )

̅|

|

̅|.

(4.4.9)
(

, one can find , say
|

for all . In addition,

) so that |
̅|

̅|

,

. Therefore, ̅ is a

LUAS equilibrium state.
Proof of (b): Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.2.5). We suppose that

( ̅)

. Again

by repeating the reasoning used in the proof of (a), there exists an interval
(̅

)

̅

, such that
| ( )

( )

( ̅)|

( )

( )|

for all

̅|, for

. Moreover, we have
.

Hence,
|
Because ( )

( )

̅|

|

̅|.

, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state.

Remark 4.4.1 From Corollary 4.4.1, the LUAS condition of SE process is
( ̅)
Moreover,

(4.4.10)
( ̅)

is an increasing function,

. Thus, the solution

is oscillation-

free. See Figure 4.4a.
4.4.2 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE)
The stability of the equilibrium state of CAE process is parallel to the stability of the
equilibrium state of the SE process. For the sake of completeness, we formulate the
results. The detailed proofs can be reconstructed by repeating the arguments used in
Section 4.4.1.
Proposition 4.4.2 We assume that all hypotheses of Proposition 4.4.1 remain true. Let
[

]∫

(̅

(

̅))

and

where ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2).
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[

]∫

(̅

(

̅))

,

)

a) If ((
b) If ∫

)
(

(̅

̅))

)

c) If ((

, then ̅ is a GUAS equilibrium state,

)

, then ̅ is a GUS equilibrium state,
, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state.

Proof of (a): Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2). For any

[

] and the

generalized mean-value theorem, we have
( )

( ̅)

(

̅) ∫

(̅

)

∫

(

̅))

(̅

(

.

Hence,
( )

( ̅)

(

̅) [(

̅))

].

(4.4.11)

By repeating the argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.1, inequalities (4.4.2),
(4.4.3) and (4.4.7) are reduced to
| ( )
|

( ̅)|
̅|

)

((
[(

)|

)

]|

̅|,

(4.4.12)

̅|,

(4.4.13)

and
|

̅|

((

)

)

|

respectively. Moreover, under the assumption, ((

(4.4.14)

̅|,
)

)

, ̅ is a GUAS

equilibrium state.
Proof of (b): The proof of (b) can be reconstructed from the proof of Proposition
4.4.1(b).
Proof of (c): Imitating the arguments used in the proofs of (a) and Proposition 4.4.1(c),
we have
|

̅|

((

)

)
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|

̅|.

(4.4.15)

)

Thus, from the assumption, ((

)

, one concludes that ̅ is unstable

equilibrium state.
In the following, we formulate a result parallel to Corollary 4.4.1.
Corollary 4.4.2 We assume that all assumptions of Proposition 4.4.2 remain valid,
except statements (a) and (c) are replaced by:
a) If ((

)

( ̅))

, then ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state,

b) If ((

)

( ̅))

, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state,

is continuously differentiable at ̅.

where

Proof: The proofs of (a) and (b) can be constructed based on the proofs of Corollary
4.4.1 and Proposition 4.4.2. The details are omitted.
)

Remark 4.4.2 We observe that the conditions ((
)

((

)

, in Proposition 4.4.2 are equivalent to

respectively. Moreover, the conditions ((
( ̅))

)

)

in Corollary 4.4.2 are also equivalent to

,

,

and

( ̅))
( ̅)

and

and
,
)

and ((
( ̅)

.

Remark 4.4.3 The stability and instability results with respect to discrete time dynamic
process described in Remark 4.3.1 can be formulated. In this case, the stability conditions
(a), (b) and (c) in Proposition 4.4.2 reduce to ((
)

)

, respectively, where

)

)

is defined in Proposition 4.4.2. Moreover, the

stability and instability conditions of Corollary 4.4.2 become ((
and ((

) ( ̅)

)

and ((

,

) ( ̅)

)

, respectively. A remark similar to Remark 4.4.2 is valid

with regard to the process described in Remark 4.3.1.
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4.4.3 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE)
First, we develop elementary notations and framework to rewrite the second order
nonlinear difference equation (4.3.6).
[

For

] and

[

]. Let ̅ be the fixed state of function

in (4.3.6), and let

us define
( )

(

(̅

(

̅) ̅

̅)).

From this, we have
( )
(

)

(

( ̅ ̅)

)(

̅)

( )

( )

(

(

(̅

)(

̅)

∫

̅))(

(

(̅

̅),

̅))

(

̅)

Hence,
(

)

(

̅

)(

( ̅)(

̅)
(

∫ [ (̅

̅)
( ̅)]

̅))

(

̅)

(4.4.16)

.

Let us define a transformation,
[

]

[

̅

̅

].

(4.4.17)

From (4.4.17) and (4.4.18), equation (4.3.6) is rewritten as
(
where

[

We note that

( ̅)
[

is the eigenvalue of
where

√(

(

)

],

(

( ̅) (

)

for which
)

)

) ,
[

(4.4.18)

∫ [ (̅

)

( ̅)]

] is a linear operator. Therefore,
(

)

( ̅)
√(

( ̅) and
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, where

.
)

]

( ̅).

We note that for

,
|

|

(4.4.19)

We present the following Proposition:
Proposition 4.4.3 Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.6).
, then ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state,

a) From (4.4.19) and if
b) From (4.4.19) and if |
c) If
d) If

|

and

, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state,
, then the solution process is a damped oscillatory,

, then the solution process is an undamped oscillatory.

Proof: Using the analytic argument, the proof of these statements can be reconstructed.
The technical details are omitted.
Remark 4.4.4 From

( ̅)

, we observe that the condition | |

and

Proposition 4.4.3 is equivalent to

( ̅)

in

.

Remark 4.4.5 The stability and instability conditions with respect to discrete time
dynamic process described in Remark 4.3.2 can be formulated. In this case, the
eigenvalues are modified to
√( )

(

√( )

) ( ̅) and

(

) ( ̅).

A remark similar to Remark 4.4.4 is valid with regard to the process defined in Remark
4.3.1.

4.5 Speed of Adjustment
The speed of adjustment,

, plays an important role in CAE and LAE processes. In

(4.3.1) and (4.3.5), it is assumed to be
condition by allowing

. In this section, however, we relax this

to be bigger than zero (
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).

4.5.1 Current Adaptive Expectation (CAE)
Under the new range of

, the stability and instability conditions of CAE process in

Proposition 4.4.2 are modified in the following results. We simply state the results
without the proofs. The proofs can be constructed by imitating the proof of Proposition
4.4.2.
Proposition 4.5.1 Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2) and

and

are defined in

Proposition 4.4.2
a) If |(
b) If ∫
c) If |(

)

|
(

(̅
)

, then ̅ is a GUAS equilibrium state,
̅))

|

, then ̅ is a GUS equilibrium state,
, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state.

Likewise, the stability and instability conditions of Corollary 4.4.2 are modified and
presented in the following corollary:
Corollary 4.5.1 Let ̅ be an equilibrium state of (4.3.2).
a) If |(

)

( ̅)|

, then ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state,

b) If |(

)

( ̅)|

, then ̅ is an unstable equilibrium state,

where

is continuously differentiable at ̅.

In the following, we illustrate the significance of this corollary by providing the
relationship between the speeds of adjustment ( ) and the speed of the market share
adjustment process ( ( ̅)) in the context of stability and oscillatory properties of the
market share adjustment process.
Remark 4.5.1 The stability condition of ̅ for CAE process in Corollary 4.5.1(a) is
equivalent to the following condition:
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( ̅)
Moreover, if (

)

( ̅)

.

(4.5.1)

, then the solution process

oscillates with respect

to the equilibrium state ( ̅). This condition is equivalent to
( ̅)

.

(4.5.2)

In particular,
i.

If

( ̅)

, then ̅ is non-oscillatory LUAS. See region (A) in Figure

( ̅)

, then ̅ is a damped oscillatory LUAS. See region (B)

4.4a.
ii.

If

in Figure 4.4a.
iii.

If (

)

( ̅)

, if and only if

( ̅)

then

is an unbound non-

oscillatory solution. See region (C) in Figure 4.4a.
iv.

If (

)

( ̅)

, if and only if

( ̅)

then

is an undamped

oscillatory solution. See region (D) in Figure 4.4a.
Remark 4.5.2 The stability and instability conditions with respect to discrete time
dynamic process described in Remark 4.3.1 in the context of arbitrary speed of
adjustment process and Proposition 4.5.1 (a), (b) and (c) are described by |(
|

and |(

,

)

|

, respectively. Moreover, the stability and

instability conditions of Corollary 4.5.1 reduce to |(
) ( ̅)

|

)

) ( ̅)

|

and |(

, respectively. Moreover, in the light of Remark 4.5.1, the stability and

oscillation conditions with regard to this case are as follows:
a) We assume that

. Under this assumption, the stability conditions are

reduced to the conditions in Remark 4.4.3.
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b) We assume that
(

i.

, we draw the following conclusions:

) ( ̅)

( ̅)

if and only if

. Under this

assumption, ̅ is a non-oscillatory LUAS. See region (A) in Figure 4.4b.
(

ii.

) ( ̅)

( ̅)

if and only if

.

Under this condition, ̅ is a damped oscillatory LUAS. See region (B) in
Figure 4.4b.
iii.

(

) ( ̅)

if and only if

( ̅)

. Under this assumption, ̅ is

unstable. See region (C) in Figure 4.4b.
iv.

(

) ( ̅)

if and only if

( ̅)

. In this case, ̅ is an

undamped oscillatory. See region (D) in Figure 4.4b.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.4 Stability and oscillating regions of CAE process with regard to (a) Remark
4.5.1 and (b) Remark 4.5.2
4.5.2 Lagged Adaptive Expectation (LAE)
From

√(

)

√(

( ̅) and

dominant root, and hence,
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)

( ̅). Let

be the

| |
| |

{
Because of

and

( ̅)

|
|

|
|

, we have

and

{
If |

|

, ̅ is a LUAS equilibrium state. This stability condition reduces to |
( ̅)

|

(Kocic and Ladas, 1993).

Remark 4.5.3 The stability condition of ̅ for LAE process is equivalent to the following
condition:
( ̅)
In addition, if

and

( ̅)

.

, then the solution process

(4.5.3)
oscillates with respect to the

equilibrium state ( ̅). This condition is equivalent to
(4.5.4)

.
In particular,
i.

If

and

( ̅)

, then ̅ is a non-oscillatory LUAS. See region (A) in

and

( ̅)

, then

Figure 4.5c.
ii.

If

is an unbound and non-oscillatory solution.

See region (C) in Figure 4.5c.
iii.

If

and

( ̅)

, then ̅ is a damped oscillatory LUAS. See region

(B) in Figure 4.5c.
iv.

If

and

( ̅)

, then

is an undamped oscillatory solution. See

region (D) in Figure 4.5c.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4.5 Stability and oscillating regions of (a) SE (b) CAE and (c) LAE process.
Figure 4.5 exhibits the decomposition of the first quadrant into the subsets consisting of
the ordered pair of parameters (

( ̅)) that create the various characteristics of

equilibrium states. The parametric subset (A) is a non-oscillatory LUAS region; the
parametric subset (B) consists of a damped oscillatory LUAS region; the subset (C)
characterizes the unstable region and subset (D) consists of the undamped oscillatory
region.
From (4.4.10), (4.5.1)-(4.5.4), the stability and oscillating conditions of SE, CAE and
LAE processes are the same when

, and are different when

4.6 and Table 4.2.

Figure 4.6 Stability and oscillating regions of all processes
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. See Figure

Table 4.2 Stability of equilibrium state and oscillatory of all processes
Region
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L

SE
Stability
Oscillation
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

CAE
Stability
Oscillation
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

LAE
Stability
Oscillation
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

In the following remark, we compare the expectation type in the context of stability and
oscillatory properties.
Remark 4.5.4
i.

In the case of SE, the parametric subset is composed two non-oscillatory regions,
stable and unstable. Moreover, the stable region is the union of subsets
and , while the unstable region is the union of subsets
{

ii.

and ,

}.

In the case of CAE, the stable region is the union of subsets
while the unstable region is the union of subsets

and ,

and ,
{

}.

The effects of the CAE process reduce the stability region and increase the
instability region. In addition, the stability region of CAE process decomposes
into two types of regions, namely non-oscillatory and damped oscillatory. The
CAE process has destroyed the stability region of SE process, and it is replaced
by the undamped oscillatory region.
iii.

In the case of LAE, the stable region is the union of subsets
unstable region is the union of subsets
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and ,

and , while the
{

}. The effects

of LAE process have further diminished the stability region and increased the
instability region of LAE process.
In summary, the stability regions (SR), the instability regions (IR) and the oscillatory
regions (OR) of SE, CAE and LAE processes are ordered as
(

) ,

(

)

(

)

(

) and

(

(

)

(

)

(
)

)
(

) ,

respectively.

4.6 Initial State
In the previous sections, we discuss the stability of equilibrium states and found that the
actual and expected network market share converge to the stable equilibrium state.
However, in network goods, the multiple equilibriums are commonly assumed, so then
the location of equilibrium is determined by the initial expected network market share of
a consumer,

. Using the Illustration 4.2.1, there are three equilibrium states. Figure 4.7

is the solution paths of SE and CAE processes for various initial states.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.7 Solution path for various initial points of SE (a) and CAE (b) when (
,

(

), price = 2.5 and
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)

For the SE process along with the CAE process, if the initial state,

[

̅ ), then the

solution paths will converge at ̅ ; if the initial state,

̅ , then the solution paths

(̅

], then the solution paths will

will be a fixed point ̅ ; if the initial state,

converge at ̅ . Moreover, the adjustment process of the SE process is faster than the
CAE process. In the case of the LAE process, we need a pair of initial states at a first and
second period, (

). Figure 4.8 is a phase diagram of LAE process for various initial

states. The solution paths will converge at either the lower or upper stable equilibrium
state, if any pairs of initial states start in area (1) and area (2), respectively.

Figure 4.8 Phase diagram for various pairs of initial points of LAE process when
(

)

,

(

), price = 2.5 and

4.7 Conclusions
In the study of network goods, the market share has an influence on the utility. In this
work, employing the idea of Katz and Shapiro (1985), we modify the utility function that
depends on the value of network externality function at an expected market size/share at a
real time,

. Therefore, consumers must speculate the market share through their

expectations. In this chapter, we briefly review two well-known expectations, namely,
rational and static. We introduced a well-known expectation, namely, adaptive
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expectation with current information about the market share. We further extend this
adaptive expectation by employing lagged information. By utilizing the modified utility
function, the concept of market share adjustment function is introduced, and further
dynamic models corresponding to consumer rational, static, and current and lagged
adaptive expectation processes are developed in a systematic and unified way. By using
mathematical tools, we establish the existence of equilibrium state and its independence
of adaptive expectations. Furthermore, the qualitative properties of equilibrium states
(stability, oscillatory) depend on the dynamic models and speed of adjustment parameter.
The introduction of adaptive processes generates both damped and undamped
oscillations. Moreover, for

, the stability results are independent of the types

of expectation. However, when

, the stability and the oscillation properties depend

on both the speed of adjustment ( ) and the speed of the market share adjustment
process ( ( ̅)) at the equilibrium state ̅. In fact, the positive quadrant described by
(

( ̅)) can be decomposed into mutually disjointed subsets. Moreover, this leads to

the decomposition of the positive quadrant that is based on the properties of the
equilibrium states of the market share adjustment process. These results provide tools for
policy and decision making processes for network goods.
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CHAPTER 5
AGENT-BASED MODELING SIMULATION UNDER
LOCAL NETWORK EXTERNALITY

In general, consumer utility of network goods is affected by the entire network size. The
socio-cultural-economic affinities of consumers influence the network externality
processes. In this chapter, we treat a consumer decision as a consumer decision dynamic
process. We then formulate a dynamic structural representation of a consumer network
structure, structure of utility function and decision rule under the influence of local
network externality concept. This formulation generates a mathematical model for a
consumer decision dynamic process. The byproduct of the dynamic model leads to an
agent-based simulation model. The simulation model is used to investigate different types
of consumer decision dynamic market equilibriums. Moreover, prototype illustrations are
given to exhibit the association between network attributes and its market equilibriums.

5.1 Introduction
There is a tremendous growth in the literature analyzing the area of network externality,
for example, Economides and Salop (1992), Economides (1996), Farrell and Katz (2000),
Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). A common assumption in the
study of network externality is that all consumers are equally likely to interact to each
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other. Consequently, network externality depends on the network size irrespective of an
eco-socio-cultural structure of consumer network community. In real situations, the
network externality arises from the size of local neighborhood and certain attributes of
consumers rather than the entire network. For example, cell phone networks and software
packages have local network externality, because user’s utility depends on the number of
his/her interacting friends (co-workers) under the usage of the same network (package)
rather than on the entire market.
Utilizing the concepts of consumer based value of network goods, externality function
and prices of multiple network market goods, Katz and Shapiro (1985) initiated a static
mathematical model of utility and formulated a decision rule under the homogeneous
consumer decision process. In addition, this work deals with the rational equilibrium
(under fulfilled expectation assumption) and the study of welfare at the equilibrium.
Recently, partitioning the consumer community into interacting groups, Banerji and
Dutta (2009) have generalized Katz and Shapiro (1985) model. Moreover, the work also
deals with allocation conditions for the rational equilibrium and its byproduct to the
market segmentation. Using the idea of local network externality, network structure and
Hotelling line, Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010) constructed a utility function, and studied
the characterization of rational equilibrium under the parametric variation of the static
dynamic of network consumers for two network firms. Employing a local network
externality and a network structure in the context of graph theory (setting a customer as a
vertex and an edge as interaction) and Pareto-rank based scalar neighborhood probability;
Sundararajan (2007) has shown that the Bayes-Nash equilibria of the network game are
monotone strategies. In addition, each Bayes-Nash equilibrium has a corresponding
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fulfilled expectation equilibrium. Moreover, Dynamic Models of Adaptive Expectations
for Network Goods (Paothong and Ladde, 2013) motivates to extend the characterization
of rational equilibrium to adaptive type equilibria.
Furthermore, from a recent study on two-scale network dynamic model of human
mobility process (Wanduku and Ladde, 2011), we conclude that the eco-socio-cultural
interactions generate inhomogeneity in the network goods consumer community, and the
inhomogeneity generates a local network externality. The group dynamic interaction
(Ladde and Ladde, 2012) and collective behavior of multi-agent network dynamic
systems (Chandra and Ladde, 2010) signify the role and scope in the area of network
goods in the 21st century.
In this chapter, by introducing the idea of consumer decision dynamic process under the
influence of socio-cultural economic affinities, a dynamic structural representation of
consumer network structure, structure of utility function, local network externality
function and consumer decision rule are formulated. This formulation generates a
mathematical model for a consumer decision dynamic process. The byproduct of this
model is the development of a consumer agent-based simulation model. The developed
simulation model is used to characterize the network attributes with its market equilibria.
The agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) approach of Axelord (1997) is employed
to determine the equilibrium under the local externality. We treat customers as agents in
the model. They adapt their attributes at each period until steady states are achieved.
Thus, the complex adaptive process is suitable for the simulation work.
In Section 5.2, we developed a consumer decision model that is composed of network
structure, structure of utility function and consumer decision rule. In Section 5.3, we
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describe some characteristics of market equilibrium. This formulation would provide the
structures and behavior rules of consumers for ABMS. In Section 5.4, a consumer agentbased model is developed. The ABMS is employed to investigate the relationship
between the network attributes and the characteristics of market equilibrium under the
influence of local network externality in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. These results illustrate the
effects of network attributes on the market equlibria.

5.2 Development of Consumer Decision Model
In this section, we treat the consumer decision to be a dynamic process. The decision
forces are induced by a current consumer utility of network goods and relative
magnitudes of affinities of consumer neighborhood structure. The influence of the
consumer decision forces are measured by the market price, and the fraction of consumer
network externality function coupled with inter-consumer socio-cultural-economic
affinities.
Under this consideration, the dynamic model of a consumer decision process under local
network externality caused by socio-cultural-economic conditions is composed of three
parts: network structure, structure of utility function and consumer decision rule. In the
following, we develop the model components, and formulate a mathematical model of
consumer decision dynamic process.
5.2.1 Network Structure
Under the influence of local network externality, consumer utility is affected by the
consumption of his/her neighbor and his/her satisfaction of the network good. However,
the definitions of “neighbor” and “satisfaction” rely on the network structure. We
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consider two network structures, namely, socio-cultural-economic structure and
technological structure. The socio-cultural-economic structure provides a basis to define
“neighbor” while the technological structure induces to define “satisfaction” of the
network good.
5.2.1.1 Socio-cultural-economic Structure
We extend the concept of socio-cultural-economic preference described in Fjeldstad,
Moen and Riis (2010), Ladde and Ladde (2012) and Chandra and Ladde (2010). Let
[

the number of consumers in the market and

]

be

be the socio-cultural-

economic K-dimensional column vector of the ith consumer, where

represents the

socio-cultural-economic preference measure (affinity) of the ith consumer for the mth
(

socio-cultural-economic feature. Let

) be the magnitude of the mth

socio-cultural-economic affinity between the ith and jth consumer, where
projection on the mth component subspace. Let

[

]

in which

is

be the ith

consumer radius characterizing the maximum influence of the mth component of sociocultural-economic affinity that he/she can be influenced by the jth consumer. Thus, the
jth consumer will be the neighborhood of the ith consumer, if the magnitude of at least
one component of

is less than or equal to

(Dugundji, 1967) of the ith consumer at the time
} where (

]

)

{

is

, that is, the neighborhood
( )

{

(

)[

}. This type of neighborhoods provides the

basis for the idea of local externality for the network goods.
5.2.1.2 Technological Structure
We extend the concept of technological preference in Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010).
Let

[

]

be the technological L-dimensional column vector of the ith consumer

80

where

represents the technological preference measure of the ith consumer for the nth

technological component feature. We further assume that firm A and B offer comparable
network goods located at points A,

[

]

[

and B,

]

, where

and

represent the nth technological component feature of respective goods. Let
(

)|

| be the technological distance between firm A and the ith

consumer. This distance induces the technological influence for the network goods.
Remark 5.2.1 We note that the socio-cultural-economic and technological vectors may
be related in a similar of Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010). For example, when choosing
the software programming, professors in Statistics prefer SAS while professors in
Economic prefer MATLAB. Thus, we can write the socio-cultural-economic vector as
(

) where

is LxK transform matrix,

multivariate uniform distribution on
independent, and if
Remark 5.2.2 When

and

. If

is Lx1 matrix that has
then

and

are

they are perfectly correlated.
,

,

and

(

) , the above

described model reduces to the Hotelling location line model. In other word, the
Hotelling location line model is the special case of the above model. See Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Image of Hotelling location line model
5.2.1.3 Neighborhood and Consumer Decompositions
For each time , we classify each consumer of the network as either a Type-A or Type-B
consumer. We introduce Type-A and Type-B consumer functions that are defined by:
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( )

{

and

(5.2.1)
( )

where

{

and

stand for consumer type functions. We observe that a neighborhood is
( ) and

( ) be the decomposed sub-

neighborhoods of the ith consumer neighborhood,

( ), corresponding to the Type-A

decomposed into two types. Let

and Type-B goods at the time . Thus, we have
( )

( )

{

( )

}
(5.2.2)

( )

( )

{

( )

}.

Remark 5.2.3
1. Clearly
{

( )

( )

( ) and ∑

( )} is a partition of

{

( )

( ) and

( )}

( )

.

( )

be a number of elements in the set. Thus, it is obvious that
(

( ))

(

Furthermore,
( ). Let ( )
(

( ))

( )).

2. Moreover, we can redefine Equation (5.2.1) as
( )

{

⋃

( )

⋃

( )

and

( )

{

⋃
⋃

( )

.
( )

(5.2.1*)

5.2.2 Structure of Utility Function
In this subsection, we provide the description of consumer utility under the influence of
structure of local network externality and technological feature. By comparing the utility
of two goods, each consumer chooses to consume either Type-A or Type-B good at a
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time . The structure of utility function is composed of four components, stand-alone
value of good ( ), network externality due to his/her neighbors who have consumed the
same good (

), compatibility cost due to his/her neighbors who have consumed the

different goods (

), and price of good ( ).
( )

( )

( )

(5.2.3)

We remark that the stand-alone value and price of network goods are assumed to be
constant.
Remark 5.2.4 The negative sign ( ) of the price in equation (5.2.3) signifies that the
utility function measures the consumer surplus of each consumer.
5.2.2.1 Stand-Alone Value
The stand-alone value is defined by the satisfaction of good regardless of the decision of
his/her neighbor. In general, this value is not uniform among consumers. In fact, the
satisfaction increases when the technological distance decreases. By using the idea of the
transportation cost in Hotelling location model (Sanjo, 2007), we introduce the concept of
the consumer stand-alone value as a function of his/her location. The stand-alone value of
Type A and Type-B goods are defined by
{

(

)|

(

)|

|
|

Remark 5.2.5 The constant of proportionality

( )
( )

.

(5.2.4)

is a network attribute. It measures the

weight of stand-alone value to the utility. We observed that “the higher value of , the
lower strength of network externality”.
5.2.2.2 Network Externality
The network externality is the benefit that a consumer gets from his/her neighbors who
consume the same good. The consumer considers the ratio of his/her neighbor for both
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types of consumers and determines his/her benefit. The network externality is an
increasing function on the ratio of neighbors who consumed the same good. For this kind
of benefit, we employ the generalized network externality function, , (Paothong and
Ladde, 2012), where

[

]

[

],

( )

and

( )

.

See Figure 5.2a. However, the influence of the neighbor may decrease along the distance;
hence we introduce a scale function, (
The scale

function

(

)

has

), that has a diminishing property in radius, .

the following properties:

,

(

)

and

. For detail, see Figure 5.2b. Therefore, at the time , the network

externality of the ith consumer is as:
( )

(

) (

( )
{

( )

(

) (

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

)

( )
(5.2.5)

)

( )

Figure 5.2 Graphs of (a) network externality and (b) scale function that meets all
assumptions
5.2.2.3 Compatibility Cost
The compatibility cost is the cost that a consumer compensates for his/her neighbors who
consume the different good. Similar to the network externality, we employ the
generalized network externality and scale function to the compatibility cost. Hence,
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( )

(

) (

( )
( )

{

(

) (

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

( )

)

(5.2.6)
( )

)

Equation (5.2.4) shows that the stand-alone value depends on location regardless of
neighborhood. But, the Equation (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) show that the network externality and
compatibility cost depends on the size of neighborhood regardless of location.
Inserting (5.2.4), (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) into (5.2.3), yields the utility of ith consumer at a
time as:
( )

(

)|

|

(

) (

(

)|

|

(

) (

( )
{

( )

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

)
)

(

) (

(

) (

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

(

( ))

)
)

( )

.

(5.2.7)

( )

Remark 5.2.6 For the Type-A consumer, the coefficients in utility function (5.2.7),
and , control the significance of four components. For example,

is small

for non-network goods.
5.2.3 Consumer Decision Rule
We are ready to state a decision rule. For each period of time, all consumers compare
their utilities from both goods and update their consumption choices. The simple
algorithm that determines the consumption for the succeeding time is as follow:

(

)

( )
( )
( )

{
( )

Let
( )
{

( )
( ).
( )

(5.2.8)

( ) be the difference of consumer utilities of two goods at a time ,
( ) . We define an indicator function relative to a set
. Using this definition, equation (5.2.8) can be written as:
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as,

( )
( )

(

)

(

( ))

( )

{ }

(

( )),

(5.2.9)

This means that “The consumer will consume a good that generates the higher utility or
will keep his/her current good if the utilities of the goods are the same.” This statement is
called consumer decision rule and Equation (5.2.9) is referred as a consumer decision
dynamic model under the influence of both network structure and consumer utility
function through consumer decision rule. We remark that (5.2.9) is indirectly controlled
by the network attributes and consumer expectation process. In Table 5.1, we have
summarized all seven network attributes.
Table 5.1 Network attributes of ABMS for two firms
Network attributes
Consumer radius
Market size
Initial market share
Price
Strength of stand-alone value
Strength of network externality
Strength of compatibility cost

Symbol
[ ]
( )

Domain

( )

[

]

Illustration 5.2.1

Figure 5.3 Image of network attributes for Illustration 5.2.1
We illustrate the above model by considering the simple case referred in Remark 5.2.2,
,

,

(

and

) . We consider that there are 10

consumers. The solid and clear dots represent consumers who consume the Type-A and
Type-B good, respectively. The set of numbers corresponding to the dots is an index set
of consumer. See Figure 5.3. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
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and

. Furthermore, we specify the network externality and scale

functions that meet all conditions, and they are
( )

(

,

)

(5.2.10)

and
(

)

.

(5.2.11)

Let us consider the sixth consumer who consumes the Type-B good, and his/her location
is

( )

. This implies that

and

. If
( ))

one neighbor who consumes the Type-A good, (

this case, the utility of the Type-A and Type-B goods are

, he/she has only
and (

( )

( ))

. In
( )

and

, respectively. From this, we infer that the utility of the Type-A good is greater than
from the Type-B good. This implies that he/she will change his/her consumption from
Type-B to Type-A for the following time,

(

)

. For

, he/she has two

neighbors and the utilities of Type-A and Type-B goods are the same. Thus, he/she will
preserve his/her consumption of the Type-B good. For further details, see Table 5.2.
Moreover, if we know the exact values of

and ten locations, then we can track all

consumer attributes for all time. Without loss in generality and for the sake of simplicity,
we used the uniform distribution as an illustration.
Table 5.2 Decision of the sixth consumer for Illustration 5.2.1
( )
( )
( ))
( ))
(
(
0.1
0
1
0

( )

(

)
1

0.2

0

1

1

0

0.3

0

2

3

0

0.5

0

5

4

1
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5.3 Characteristics of Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium in the context of simulation process occurs at an approximate
steady state time,

. The feasibility of this is assured by the stability property of

equilibrium states described in Paothong and Ladde (2013/2014). This means that all
consumer attributes are unchanged. In this section, we discuss three following interesting
characteristics of market equilibrium.
5.3.1 Market Share of Type-A Good
( ) is the ratio of the number of consumers

The market share of the Type-A good,

who consume the Type-A good to the number of all consumers at a time ,
( )

( )

∑

( ) is reduced to

In particular, at the steady state time,
(

and its range is,

)

(5.3.1)

.

(

. If

)

(

)

(

∑

)

, then the firm A dominates

the entire market and drives the firm B out of the market. In addition, the expected
market share of the Type-A good at the initial time (

) is [

( )]

. This is

determined by the Bernoulli distribution of consumer type at the initial time,
( )

( ).

5.3.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
In this subsection, we utilize the concept of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index,

()

(Hirschman, 1964) to measure the market concentration at a time . It is determined by
the sum of squares of the market shares of all firms in an industry. In the case of duopoly,
( )

(

( ))

(

( ))
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(

( )

)

.

(5.3.2)

( ) is reduced to

In particular, at the steady state time,
)

(

and its range is,

)
(

dominates the entire market. If

(

. If
)

)

(

)

(

(

)

, then either firm A or firm B

, then it implies that both firms split the

share evenly. In addition, we compute the expectation of this index at the initial time
(

), and we have [

( )]

.

5.3.3 Market Utility
( ), is the sum of utilities of all consumers at a time , that is,

The market utility,

( )

∑

( ).

(5.3.3)

From Remark 5.2.4, the market utility in (5.3.3) actually measures the consumer surplus.
In addition, from (A.6) in the Appendix A, the expected market utility at the initial state
(

) is
(

[

( )]

)

(

{
(

)(

)

)
[

[

(

)]

(

) [

(

)

]]

.

(5.3.4)

Let us consider the case in which the market is dominated at the steady state. If firm A
dominates market, then this is equivalent to
(

)

(

(

)

equivalent to

(

). Similarly, if firm B dominates market, then it is

and hence

)

{

(
(

. Hence, Equation (5.3.4) becomes

(
(

)
)

(

)

(
)
)

(

)

).
(5.3.5a)
.
(5.3.5b)

The Table 5.3 summarizes the above three characteristics of the market equilibrium at the
initial and steady state time.
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Table 5.3 Value of three characteristics at the initial time and dominant situation
( )

Market characteristics

( )

( )

Expected value at

(5.3.4)

Firm A Dominates at
Firm B Dominates at

(5.3.5a)
(5.3.5b)

5.4 Agent-Based Modeling Simulation Model
Agent-based modeling simulation is a recently introduced modeling approach to analyze
enter-agent interactions. There are at least three advantages of the ABMS. First, its
assumptions underlying the model are simple. Simplicity is also helpful for readers to
understand and for researcher to extend the model. Second, the complex adaptive process
belongs to the work of simulation. Thus, complex tools aren’t needed here. Third,
because of ABMS, all network attributes are traceable from initial state to steady state.
The ABMS is more feasible. It is based on certain assumptions and adaptable attributes
of agents. Each agent’s decision relies on his/her environment and interactions with the
others. One of the objectives of this chapter is “How do the network attributes influence
the three characteristics of market equilibrium?” To investigate this question, we adjust
the values of the seven fundamental network attributes (listed in Table 5.1) and compute
the three characteristics for each simulation. To do so, we need the following
assumptions:
a) All consumers have an identical utility function
b) All consumer locations and radii are fixed for any time,

.

c) All consumers have perfect information about their neighbor’s attributes.
d) All consumer behaviors are consistent.
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e) The prices of goods are time invariant.
Moreover, to determine the equilibrium by simulation, we need to specify the following:
1. For simplicity in simulation, we assign
(

,

,

and

)

2. The network externality function in (5.2.10) is utilized.
3. The scale function in (5.2.11) is utilized.
4. The initial value of the seven network attributes is controlled in an appropriate
domain. For example,

and

represents two extreme cases, namely,

non-network and global network externality goods, respectively. Therefore, an
[

appropriate domain for radius is
normalized form. Similarly,

and

] . In fact,

is represented in a

represents a monopoly situation of

firm B and A, respectively. Hence, the choice of domain for
[

probabilistic character of initial market share,

is motivated by

]. However, there is no

upper limit for market size, price, strength of stand-alone value, strength of
network externality and strength of compatibility cost.
In the following, we exhibit each simulation step according to the objectives of our study:
Step 1. Assign various initial values to the fundamental network attributes
Step 2. Assign the values to all remaining parameters
Step 3. Generate the all consumer locations,
Step 4. Generate all consumer type at the initial time,

(
( )

)
( )

Step 5. Each consumer updates his/her type according to consumer decision dynamic
model (5.2.9) that implies
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(

)

( )
( )
( )

{
( )

( )
( )
( )

Step 6. Repeat step 5 for all consumers
Step 7. Repeat steps 5 to 6 until it attains a steady state
(

Step 8. Calculate the three characteristics of market equilibrium,
and

(

)

Step 9. Repeat steps 2 to 8 for 1000 times
Step 10. Calculate the average of

(

),

Figure 5.4 Flow chart of ABMS for two firms
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(

) and

(

)

),

(

)

5.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we outline the effects of the seven network attributes on the three
characteristics of market equilibrium under local network externality for a duopoly
market. We conduct this study for each network attribute varying over domain and fixing
remaining network attributes. We employ these settings into ABMS and plot the results
in Figure 5.5-Figure 5.11. Each figure is composed of a solid line representing the
expected value at the initial time, a dotted line showing the simulation results, and a
dashed line exhibiting the market dominated value.
5.5.1 Consumer Radius
The consumer radius increases the ability to connect to the others. We investigate its
influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In this case, we assign the values of the
parameters

and

and allow

to vary on [

]. In short, we

have the following:
[

]

According to this scenario, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.1
( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Firm A Dominates at

( )

( )

Firm B Dominates at
Under this scenario, we plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a function
of consumer radius,

[

].
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Figure 5.5 Simulated result showing influence of consumer radius on three
characteristics
Figure 5.5 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of consumer radius on the average of the
[

three characteristics. At the initial time,

( )]

and

[

( )]

. From

these simulation results at the steady state, we conclude that:
i.

the simulated market share curve is constant, and about 0.5 for all

ii.

the simulated HHI curve is non-decreasing on [
(

iii.

)

) into [

], and as

,

;

the simulated market utility curve monotonically converges to
, for

;

(

)

. In fact, this leads to the monopoly situation.

In other words, the increase in consumer radius causes to enhance the chance of
monopoly, except

.

5.5.2 Market Size
Under the constant length of the Hotelling line, the market size increases the density of
the consumer. Consequently, all consumers have more neighbors. We examine its
influence by controlling its domain. In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
and

and allow

following:
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to vary on

. In short, we have the

Based on this scenario, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.2
( )

( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Firm A Dominates at

( )

Firm B Dominates at
Under this case, we plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a function of
the market size,

.

Figure 5.6 Simulated result showing influence of market size on three characteristics
Figure 5.6 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of market size on the average of three
characteristics. At the initial time,

[

( )]

and

[

( )]

. From these

simulation results at the steady state, we draw the following conclusions:
i.

the simulated market share curve is constant, and its value is about 0.5 for any
;

ii.

the simulated HHI curve is constant, and its value is about 0.8 for any

iii.

the simulated market utility curve has estimated slope (Least Square Method)
0.1877, and hence deviates from the monopoly situation which has slope 0.2.
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;

In the other words, the increase in market size does not affect the market concentration
but increases the market utility.
5.5.3 Initial Market Share
The initial market share represents the market share of Type-A good at the initial time
(

). Now, we show its influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In this case,

we assign the values of the parameters
vary on [

and

and allow

to

]. In summary, we have the following:
[

]

Using these parameter values, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.3
( )

Market characteristics

( )

( )
(

Expected value at

)

Firm A Dominates at
Firm B Dominates at
Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a
function of the initial market share,

[

].

Figure 5.7 Simulated result showing influence of initial market share on three
characteristics
Figure 5.7 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of initial market share on the average of
three characteristics. At the initial time from Table 5.3, we have [
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( )]

and [

(

( )]

)

. From these simulation results at the steady state, we

draw the following conclusions:
i.

the simulated market share curve increases and it is S-shaped between 0 to 1;

ii.

the simulated HHI curve is one when |

iii.

the simulated market utility curve converges to the monopoly situation when
|

iv.

|

for

|

;

;
, the simulated curves (a), (b) and (c) signify that both firms

A and B are operating with the increasing market share of firm A, the decreasing
market share of firm B, and the market utility is less than the monopoly situation.
In other words, (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as “if the initial market share is too low
(high), then the firm will completely lose (win) the market”.
5.5.4 Price
To consume either the Type-A or B good, all consumers consider price of both goods,
and

. For the sake of simplicity for simulation, we assign

. Hence, the

difference of price is the price of Type-A good itself, it is represented by

.

We investigate its influence by controlling its domain. In this case, we assign the values
of the parameters

and

and allow

to vary on

we have the following:

Using these values of parameters, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.7.
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. In short,

Table 5.7 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.4
( )

( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Firm A Dominates at
Firm B Dominates at

( )

Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a
function of the price of Type-A good,

, where

is as define before.

Figure 5.8 Simulated result showing influence of price on three characteristics
Figure 5.8 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of price on the average of three
characteristics. From these simulation results at the steady state, we draw the following
conclusions:
i.

the simulated market share curve is negatively S-shaped (Paothong and Ladde,
2012);

ii.

the simulated HHI curve is one when |

|

iii.

the market utility converges to the monopoly situation when |

iv.

for

;
|

;

, the simulated curves (a), (b) and (c) signify that both

firms A and B are operating with the decreasing market share of firm A, the
increasing market share of firm B, and the market utility is less than the monopoly
situation.
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In the other words, (ii) and (iii) signify the fact that “if the price is too low (high), then
the firm will completely win (lose) the market”.
5.5.5 Strength of Stand-Alone Value
The strength of stand-alone value represents the significance of location in the Hotelling
model. We examine its influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In this case, we
assign the values of the parameters
on

and

and allow

to vary

. In short, we have the following:

From these given values of the parameters, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.8.
Table 5.8 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.5
( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Firm A Dominates at
Firm B Dominates at

( )

( )

Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a
function of the strength of stand-alone value,

.

Figure 5.9 Simulated result showing influence of strength of stand-alone value on three
characteristics
Figure 5.9 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of strength of stand-alone value on the
average of the three characteristics. At the initial time,
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[

( )]

and

[

( )]

. From these simulation results at the steady state, we conclude the

following:
i.

the simulated market share curve is constant, and it is about 0.5 for all

ii.

the simulated HHI curve is non-increasing and defined on
,

;

into [

], and as

, that is, the strength of stand-alone value diminishes the

chance of monopoly;
iii.

the simulated market utility curve converges to

for all

.

5.5.6 Strength of Network Externality
We measure the strength of network externality through two constants,

and

. For

the sake of simplicity, for simulation, and to compare the relative strength of two
networks, we assign

. Hence, their relative strength is the strength of network A

itself, it is denoted by

. We investigate its influence by controlling its

appropriate domain. In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
and

and allow

to vary on

. In short, we have the

following:

Using these parametric values, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.9.
Table 5.9 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.6
( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Value if firm A Dominates at
Value if firm B Dominates at

( )

( )
(
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)

Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a
function of the strength of network externality,

, where

is as defined

before.

Figure 5.10 Simulated result showing influence of strength of network externality on
three characteristics
Figure 5.10 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of strength of network externality on
the average of the three characteristics. From these simulation results at the steady state,
we have the following concluding observations:
i.

the simulated market share curve diminishingly increases;

ii.

the simulated HHI curve decreases when

iii.

the simulated market utility curve approaches the monopoly situation of firm A
when

and increases when

;

.

In the other words, firm B has more chance to dominate the market when
and firm A has more chance to dominate the market when

is small

is large.

5.5.7 Strength of Compatibility
We measure the strength of compatibility through the constants,

and

. For the sake

of ease in simulations and to compare the relative strength of compatibilities, we assign
. Hence, their relative strength is the strength of compatibility A itself, it is
denoted by

. We show its influence by controlling its appropriate domain. In
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this case, we assign the values of the parameters
allow

to vary on

and

and

. In short, we have the following:

Using these parametric values, the Table 5.3 is reduced to Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Specific value of Table 5.3 for scenario 5.5.7
( )

( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Firm A Dominates at
Firm B Dominates at

( )
(

)

Under this case, we again plot the market share, HHI and market utility value as a
function of the strength of compatibility,

, where

is as defined before.

Figure 5.11 Simulated result showing influence of strength of compatibility on three
characteristics
Figure 5.11 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the influence of strength of compatibility on the
average of the three characteristics. From these simulation results at the steady state, we
have the following concluding observations:
i.

the simulated market share curve diminishingly decreases;

ii.

the simulated HHI decreases curve when

iii.

the simulated market utility curve approaches the dominant situation of firm B
when

.
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and increases when

;

In the other words, firm B has more chance to dominate the market when
and firm A has more chance to dominate the market when

is large

is small.

5.6 Market Share and Policies
At the beginning, the market share of firm is influenced by the probability of a consumer
type, that is [

( )]

. At equilibrium, the firm objective, in general, is to have

a high market share. In this section, we demonstrate that firm policies are dependent on
its initial market share. The large firm has a high initial market share ( [
) and the small firm has initial market share ( [
presented

results

provide

a

glimpse

of

parametric

( )]

( )]
variations

). The
as

control

mechanisms/strategies for planning and policy. We simulate the market share at the
steady state by varying two attributes at the same time, probability of consumer type and
the other six attributes.
5.6.1 Consumer Radius
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
allow

and
[

and

and

to vary. In short, we have the following:

]

[

]

Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus

and

in Figure 5.12a. It

shows that the large (small) firm prefers larger (smaller) consumer radius.
5.6.2 Market Size
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
and allow

and

to vary. In short, we have the following:
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and

and

[

]

Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus

and

in Figure 5.12b. It

shows that the market size has no influence on the market share.
5.6.3 Price
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
allow

and

and

and

to vary. In short, we have the following:
[

]

Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus

and

in Figure 5.12c. It

shows that both large and small firms need to decrease price in order to increase its
market share.
5.6.4 Strength of Stand-Alone Value
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
allow

and

and

and

to vary. In short, we have the following:
[

]

Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus

and

in Figure 5.12d. It

shows that the large (small) firm prefers the lower (higher) strength of stand-alone value.
5.6.5 Strength of Network Externality
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
allow

and

to vary. In short, we have the following:
[
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]

and

and

Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus

and

in Figure 5.12e. It

shows that both large and small firms need to increase their strength of network
externality.
5.6.6 Strength of Compatibility
In this case, we assign the values of the parameters
allow

and

and

and

to vary. In short, we have the following:
[

]

Under this case, we present 3D plot of market share versus

and

in Figure 5.12f. It

shows that both large and small firms need to decrease their strength of network
externality.

Figure 5.12 Simulated result showing 3D plots of market share versus probability of
consumer type and (a) consumer radius , (b) market size , (c) price
, (d) strength of
stand-alone value , (e) strength of network externality
, and (f) strength of
compatibility cost
.
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5.7 Conclusions
The presented consumer decision dynamic model consists of the network structure, the
structure of utility function, and the consumer decision rule. We developed the network
structure, the structure of utility function, and state the consumer decision rule in the
context of economic concepts. Using this model, we investigate the effects of the seven
network attributes on the three characteristics of market equilibrium, the market share of
Type-A good, the HHI and the market utility in network market under local network
externality. The developed consumer decision dynamic model provides a natural tool to
develop an Agent-Based Modeling Simulation. The Agent-Based Modeling Simulation
approach was used to assess the specified objectives. The seven network attributes are
described by: consumer radius ( ), market size ( ), initial market share ( ), price (
strength of stand-alone value ( ), strength of network externality (
compatibility cost (

),

), and strength of

) . Based on our simulated study, we draw the following

conclusions:
1. As the consumer radius increases, the chance of monopoly increases.
2. The market concentration is unaffected by the change of market size.
3. The lower the initial market share, the higher the chance of a firm to lose the
competition.
4. The increase in price causes its market share to decrease to zero and hence causes
the market concentration to increase to one.
5. As the strength of the stand-alone value increases, the chance of monopoly
decreases.
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6. The increase in strength of network externality causes an increase in the chance of
a firm to dominate the market.
7. The increase in strength of compatibility causes an increase in the chance of a
firm to dominate the market.
Finally, the byproduct of our study in Section 5.6 generates some market strategies for
large firms to monopolize the market and for small firms to survive (predator and prey
relationship). This is summarized in the following table.
Table 5.11 Strategies of large firm to monopolize and small firm to survive

Firm

Consumer
Radius

Price

Large
Small

High
Low

Low
Low

Strength of
StandAlone
Value
Low
High
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Strength of
Network
Externality

Strength of
Compatibility

High
High

Low
Low

CHAPTER 6
MULTI-TYPE CONSUMER INTERACTIONS UNDER
LOCAL NETWORK EXTERNALITY

In this chapter, we study the consumer interactions under a local network externality
process. For a network good, in general, the consumer utility is affected by the size of
entire network. However, under local network externality concept, the consumer utility is
affected by the size of local neighborhood instead of the entire market. We develop the
network structure, utility function, consumer decision rule and multi-type consumer
interactions. In addition, we employ an agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) to
obtain the market equilibrium. Moreover, the presented work addresses the policies of a
firm and how to monopolize or survive in the market.

6.1 Introduction
In economics, a single firm domination of the market is called Monopoly. The firm has a
huge benefit, such as a power to set up the price or a quantity of commodity to achieve
the firm’s overall objective. There are various causes of monopoly, for examples,
economy of scale (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012), large investment of capital, barrier to
entry, network externality (Samuelson and Mark, 2012), etc. For network externality, the
interactions between consumers create an additional benefit to a consumer group. It
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affects their consumptions, that is, the consumer’s utility is affected by the size of
network. Consequently, a leading firm has more chance to dominate the market by
driving its small competitors out of the business. However, in the real world situation, we
realize that small firms are able to survive in network market process. One of the reasons
among the others is that the consumer’s utility is affected by a local network externality.
Under this concept, consumer utility depends on the size of his/her neighbor, not the
entire market. The objective of this paper is to address the policies of the firms to
monopolize, or to survive in the network good market.
Paothong (2013) and Paothong and Ladde (2013/2014) have developed and investigated
the relationship between network attributes and characteristics of market equilibrium
under the influence of local network externality of two competing firms (duopoly). They
addressed how to drive its competitor out of the market. This paper extends their model
from two firms (duopoly) to multi firms. The key contribution is the additional
knowledge of relationship between network attributes and characteristics of market
equilibrium under several numbers of competitors for a network good.
The byproduct of this paper is the development of a consumer agent-based modeling
simulation model. The developed simulation model is used to characterize the network
attributes with its market equilibria. The agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS)
approach of Axelord (1997) is extended to determine the equilibrium under the influence
of local network externality. We treat customers as agents in the model. They adapt their
attributes at each period until steady states are achieved. Thus, the complex adaptive
process is suitable for the simulation work. See more about ABMS at Helbing and
Balietti (2011).
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In Section 6.2, we develop a consumer decision dynamic model that is composed of
network structure, structure of utility function and consumer decision rule under the
influence of local network externality. In Section 6.3, we describe two economic terms,
market share and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), (Hirschman, 1964). In Section 6.4,
we employ the agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) to achieve the aim of this
paper. Finally, the simulation results are presented in Section 6.5.

6.2 Development of Consumer Decision Model
The consumer decision model is composed of three parts, namely, network structure,
structure of utility function and consumer decision rule (Paothong and Ladde,
2013/2014). In this section, we treat the consumer decision to be a dynamic process. The
decision forces are induced by a current consumer utility of network goods and relative
magnitudes of affinities of consumer neighborhood structure. The influence of the
consumer decision forces are measured by the market price, and the fraction of consumer
network externality function coupled with inter-consumer socio-cultural-economic
affinities. Under this consideration, the dynamic model of a consumer decision process
under local network externality is composed of three parts: network structure, structure of
utility function and consumer decision rule. In the following, we develop the model
components for multi-firms and formulate a mathematical model of consumer decision
dynamic process.
6.2.1 Network Structure
Under the influence of local network externality, consumer utility is affected by the
consumption of his/her neighbor and his/her satisfaction of the network good. However,
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the definitions of “neighbor” and “satisfaction” depend on the network structure. We
consider two network structures, namely, socio-cultural-economic structure and
technological structure. The socio-cultural-economic structure provides a basis to define
“neighbor” while the technological structure induces to define “satisfaction” of the
network good.
6.2.1.1 Socio-cultural-economic Structure
We extend the concept of socio-cultural-economic preference described by Fjeldstad,
Moen and Riis (2010), Ladde and Ladde (2012) and Chandra and Ladde (2010). Let
the number of consumers in the market and
{

} and

(

[

]

(

where

be
)

) be the socio-cultural-economic K-dimensional column

vector of the ith consumer, where

represents the socio-cultural-economic preference

measure (affinity) of the ith consumer for the ath socio-cultural-economic feature. Let
‖

‖

∑

(

) be the the socio-cultural-economic affinity between

the ith and jth consumer, where

(

). Let

be the ith consumer radius

characterizing the maximum influence of the socio-cultural-economic affinity that he/she
can be influenced by the jth consumer. Thus, the jth consumer will be in the
neighborhood of the ith consumer, if the magnitude of
is, the neighborhood of the ith consumer at the time is

is less than or equal to , that
( )

{ [

]

}.

This type of neighborhoods provides the basis for the idea of local network externality.
6.2.1.2 Technological Structure
We extend the concept of technological preference in Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010).
Let
where

[

]
(

be the technological L-dimensional column vector of the ith consumer,
) and

represents the technological preference measure of the ith
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consumer for the bth technological component feature. Let

stand for number of firms

which offer comparable a network good. All firms are denoted by
their respective locations as

. We further assume that

with
[

]

are the
(

vertices of a regular convex M-polygon inscribed in unit circle, where

) and

represents the bth technological component feature of good from the mth firm. Let
‖

‖ be the technological distance between the mth firm and the ith

consumer. This distance induces the technological influence for the network goods.
Remark 6.2.1 We note that the socio-cultural-economic and technological vectors can be
related as in Fjeldstad, Moen and Riis (2010). For example, when choosing the software
programming, professors in Statistics prefer SAS while professors in Economic prefer
MATLAB. Thus, we can write the socio-cultural-economic vector as
(

) where

is

uniform distribution on

transform matrix,
and

is

. If

matrix that has multivariate
then

and

are independent, and if

they are perfectly correlated.
Remark 6.2.2 The Hotelling location line model is the special case of the above model.
For illustration, see Figure 6.1, when

,

,

[

],

and

is uniformly distributed in equilateral triangle inscribed in unit circle.
6.2.1.3 Neighborhood and Consumer Decompositions
For each time , we classify a consumer into one of the M sub-groups. The typethat he/she consumes the m-th good,

, for

(

). We introduce a type-

consumer function, which represents type of the ith consumer at time . For
and

(

)
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means

(

),

Figure 6.1 Image of location model of 3 firms, there are three competitive firms and
three consumers in the market. The neighborhood of the first consumer is the second
consumer, not the third one, ( ) { }.
( )

{

(6.2.1)

Moreover, his/her neighborhood is also classified into M types. Let

( ) be the type-m

neighborhoods of the ith consumer at a time , and defined by;
( )

( )

{

( )

}

(6.2.2)

Remark 6.2.3
1. We note that a consumer consumes only single good.
2. {

( )

( )

mutually
(

( ))

( )} is a partition of

disjoint
∑

(

( )

and

( ), that is, for all
⋃

( )

,
.

( ) are
Hence,

( )).

6.2.2 Structure of Utility Function
In this subsection, we provide the description of consumer utility under the influence of
structure of local network externality and technological feature. The structure of utility
function is composed of three components: stand-alone value of good ( ) , network
externality due to his/her neighbors who have consumed the same good (
of good ( ).
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) and price

( )

( )

(6.2.3)

Remark 6.2.4 The negative sign ( ) of the price in Equation (6.2.3) signifies that the
utility function measures the surplus of each consumer.
6.2.2.1 The stand-alone value
The stand-alone value is defined by the satisfaction of good regardless of the decision of
his/her neighbor. In general, this value is not uniform among consumers. In fact, the
satisfaction increases when the technological distance decreases. By using the idea of the
transportation cost in Hotelling location model (Sanjo, 2007), we introduce the concept of
the consumer stand-alone value as a function of his/her distances from the location of
firms. Let

be the distance between the

stand-alone value of the mth good,
(

th firm and the th consumer, we define the

, as
(

)

∑

Remark 6.2.5 The constant of proportionality

).

(6.2.4)

is a network attribute. It measures the

weight of stand-alone value to the utility. We observed that “the higher value of , the
lower strength of network externality”.
6.2.2.2 The network externality
The network externality is the additional benefit that a consumer gets from his/her
neighbors who consume the same good. We further assume that the network externality is
directly proportional to the size of his/her neighborhood of the same good. Hence,
( )
Remark 6.2.6 For

(
(

( ))

(

),

), the constants of proportionality

(6.2.5)
are also network

attributes. They represent the strength of network externality with respect to the type-m
good.
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Inserting (6.2.4) and (6.2.5) into (6.2.3), the utility of ith consumer of

at a time is

described by
( )

(

)

∑

( ))

(

.

(6.2.6)

Remark 6.2.7 For type-m consumer, the coefficients in utility function (6.2.7),
, control the significance of three components. If,

and

, then the mth good is non-

network good.
6.2.3 Consumer Decision Rule
We are ready to state a decision rule. For each time , all consumers compare their
utilities with respect to the network goods and update their consumptions. Let
{

} be an indicator function where

. A simple algorithm that determines the

consumption for the succeeding time is as follow:
(
(
where

)
{ }

)
{ }(

( )
( )

[

[

( )

( )

is an indicator function with

( )], or

( )]), for

(6.2.7)
(

)

(6.2.8)

{ }. This means that “The consumer will

consume a good that generates the highest utility; or the consumer will keep his/her
current good, if the utilities of the goods are the same.” This statement is called consumer
decision rule. Equation (6.2.8) is referred as a consumer decision dynamic model under
the influence of both network structure and consumer utility function through consumer
decision rule. We remark that (6.2.8) is indirectly controlled by the network attributes and
consumer expectation process. In Table 6.1, we have summarized all five network
attributes.
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Table 6.1 Network attributes of ABMS for M firms
Network structure’s attributes
Consumer radius
Initial market share
Price
Strength of stand-alone value
Strength of network externality

Symbol
[ ( )

Domain

]

[

]

Figure 6.2 Image of network attributes for Illustration 6.2.1
Illustration 6.2.1
From Figure 6.2, it follows that there are 3 competing firms and 10 consumers. These
consumers are located inside the equilateral triangle. The dot, square and star marks
represent consumers who consume

,

and

simplicity, we assume

and

the first consumer who consumes
( )

and

, (

( ))

( )
from

and

, respectively. For the sake of

and his location is

for all firms. If
and (

( ))

( )

. Let us consider
(

). This implies that

, he has only one neighbor who consumes
(

( ))

. From this, we infer that he/she gains the most utility

. This implies that the consumer will change his consumption from

the succeeding time,

( )

. In this case, his utility are

(

)

to

for

. For further details, see Table 6.2. Moreover, if we
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know the exact values of

and ten locations, then we can trace all consumer attributes

for all time.
Table 6.2 Decision of the first consumer for Illustration 6.2.1
( ))

(

goods

( ))

(

(

(

))

(

)

(

)

(

)

goods

1

0

1

0

2

1

1

1

2

3

1

3

2

2

1

1

3

4

2

2

6.3 Characteristics of Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium in the context of simulation process occurs at the steady state
time,

. This means that all consumer attributes are unchanged. In this section, we

discuss two following interesting characteristics of market equilibrium.
6.3.1 Market Share of Good
The market share of
consume

( ) is the ratio of the number of consumers who

,

to the number of all consumers at a time ,
( )

( )

∑

( ) is reduced to

In particular, at the steady state time,
( )

with its range,

(6.3.1)

.

( )

. If

, then the

( )

∑

( )

dominates the

entire market and drives the rest of the competitors out of the market. This is due to the
fact that the probability of type-m consumer at the initial time is assumed to be
[
(

( )
) is [

]

. Consequently, the expected market share of
( )]

[

∑

( )

]

.
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,

at the initial time

6.3.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
( )

In this subsection, we utilize the concept of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index,

(Hirschman, 1964) to measure monopolization of the market. It is determined by the sum
of squares of the market shares of all firms in an industry. In the case of M firms,
( )
In

particular,
( )

∑

at

∑

the

steady

(6.3.2)

( )) .

(
state

( )) with its range,

(

( )

time,

( )
( )

there is only one firm dominates the entire market. If

is

reduced

to

( )

,

. If

, then this implies

that all firms split the share equally. This is because of the fact that the probability of
type-m consumer at the initial time is assumed to be
[
(

( )

]

[

and

( )

]

(

) (

, and the other types are
) for

). Consequently, the expectation of HHI at the initial time (
[∑

(

( )) ]

(

) (

).

Figure 6.3 Expectation of HHI at the initial time for
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and
), [

( )]

,

Table 6.3 The value of two characteristics at the initial time and dominant situation
( )

Market characteristics
Expected value at
Dominant
at
Dominant
for
at

( )
(

) (

)

6.4 Agent-Based Modeling Simulation Model
Each time , all consumers decide to consume a good that provides the highest utility.
From (6.2.8), the decision of a consumer is affected by the interactions of his/her
neighbors. Consequently, a type of consumer has dynamic behavior. One of the
objectives of this work is to investigate five network attributes influence on market share
and HHI at market equilibrium. Thus, we need a tool that analyze a consumer interaction
process and also provide a dynamic formulation to have equilibrium states. The dynamic
modeling formulation naturally paves the way to apply the agent-based modeling
simulation approach. In short, the agent-based modeling simulation is suitable to further
analyze the formulated dynamic model. Each agent’s decision depends on his/her
environment and interactions with the others. There are at least three advantages of the
ABMS. First, its assumptions underlying the model are simple. Simplicity is also helpful
for readers to understand and for researchers to extend the model. Secondly, the complex
adaptive process leads to utilize the work of simulation (Paothong and Ladde
,(2013/2014)). Thirdly, all network attributes under ABMS are traceable from an initial
state to a steady state. To investigate the objective of this work, we adjust the values of
fundamental network attributes (listed in Table 1) and compute
each simulation. For this purpose, we need the following assumptions:
a) All consumers have an identical utility function
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and HHI for

b) All consumers behave identically.
c) All consumers have perfect information about their neighbor’s attributes.
d) All consumer locations are fixed and their radii are the same, for any time,

.

e) The prices of goods are time invariant.
Remark 6.4.1 To understand the effects of network attributers, the non-network
attributes factors such as utility function and consumer behavior must be homogeneous
for all consumers. Thus, the assumptions (a), (b) and (c) are essential. In general, the
price, consumer location and their radii can be time varying. However, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume them to be constant.
In the following, we exhibit each simulation step according to the objectives of our study:
Step 1. Assign various values to each fundamental network attributes (Table 6.1)
Step 2. Assign the values to all remaining parameters
Step 3. Generate the all consumer locations,

in a regular convex M polygon

Step 4. Generate type for all consumers at the initial time
[

( )

]

and

[

( )

]

(

) (

) for

Step 5. Each consumer updates his/her type according to behavior rule (6.2.8), imply
(

)

{ }(

( )

[

( )

( )])

Step 6. Repeat step 5 for all consumers
Step 7. Repeat steps 5 to 6 until it attains the steady state
Step 8. Calculate two characteristics of market equilibrium,
Step 9. Repeat steps 2 to 8 for 100 times
Step 10. Calculate the average of

( ) and

Step 11. Repeat steps 1 to 10 with various
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( )

( ) and

( )

Figure 6.4 Flow chart of ABMS for M firms

6.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we outline the effects of five network attributes on market share and HHI
at equilibrium under the influence of local network externality. We conduct this study for
each network attribute varying over its domain and fixing remaining network attributes in
Table 6.1. For each simulation, we assign the market size
generality, we pick

and

, for

and

, without loss in
(

). We employ this

setting into ABMS and plot the results in Figures 6.5-6.9.
6.5.1 Consumer Radius
As the consumer radius increases, the ability to connect the other consumers increases.
We investigate its influence by varying
remaining parameters

. That is, we assign the values of the

and allow

following:
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to vary on

. In short, we have the

Under this scenario, we plot the market share of
radius,

and HHI as a function of consumer

.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.5 Simulated result showing influence of consumer radius on two characteristics
Figure 6.5a and Figure 6.5b illustrate the influence of consumer radius on the average of
two characteristics. At the initial time, [

( )]

[

( )]

. From these

simulation results at the steady state, we conclude that:
i.

for the lower radius, the mean of market share of

is about

but its

variance is increase as the radius increases;
ii.

the simulated HHI curve is non-decreasing and converging to dominant situation
whenever the radius increases.

In other words, the increase in consumer radius causes to enhance the chance of
monopoly. Thus, a monopolizing policy is to increase the consumer interactions.
Moreover, under the larger number of competitors, the larger radius is required to
monopolize the market.
6.5.2 Initial Market Share
The initial market share represents the market share of
Now, we show its influence by varying

[
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at the initial time (

).

]. That is, we assign the values of the

remaining parameters

and allow

to vary on [

]. In summary, we

have the following:
[

]

Under this scenario, we plot the market share of
[

size,

and HHI as a function of market

].

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.6 Simulated result showing influence of initial market share of
characteristics

on two

Figure 6.6a and Figure 6.6b illustrate the influence of initial market share of

on the

average of two characteristics. At the initial time, [

( )]

(

) (

( )]

and [

). From the simulation results at the steady state, we conclude

that:
i.

the simulated

curve is non-decreasing and converging to dominant

situation whenever the initial market share of
ii.

is increasing;

the simulated HHI curve converges to dominant situation as the initial market
share of

Thus, if

increases.

needs to monopolize the market, then it must have a comparative high

market share at the beginning. Moreover, under the larger number of competitors, the
smaller initial market share is required to monopolize the market.
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6.5.3 Price
To subscribe a good, all consumers consider price of all goods. We vary the price of
and investigate its influence by varying

̅ , where ̅ is the

. Let

average price of the remaining goods. Thus, if

(

) means that the price of

is higher (lower) than the average price ̅ . That is, we assign the values of the
remaining parameters

and allow

to vary on

. In short, we have the

following:

Under this scenario, we plot the market share of
size,

and HHI as a function of market

.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.7 Simulated result showing influence of price on two characteristics
Figure 6.7a and Figure 6.7b illustrate the influence of price of
characteristics. At the initial time,

[

( )]

[

on the average of two
( )]

. From these

simulation results at the steady state, we conclude the following.
i.

If

, the market share of

will increase, and

competitors out of the market. Consequently,
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will drive the rest of the

will monopolize the market.

ii.

If

, the market share of

will decrease, and

market. Consequently, all firms excluding

will be out of the

will split the market equally; see

Figure 6.7b.
This result proves that if a firm wants to dominate the market, then it must set the
comparative low price at the early stage. Moreover, under the lager number of
competitors, consumer is more sensitive to the price. That is, a firm has to set the very
low price for the low competition.
6.5.4 Strength of Stand-Alone Value
The strength of stand-alone value represents the significance of location in model. We
examine its influence by varying

. That is, we assign the values of the remaining

parameters

to vary on

and allow

Under this scenario, we plot the market share of
of stand-alone value,

. In short, we have the following:

and HHI as a function of the strength

.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.8 Simulated result showing influence of strength of stand-alone value on two
characteristics
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Figure 6.8a and Figure 6.8b illustrate the influence of strength of stand-alone value on the
average of two characteristics. At the initial time, [

( )]

[

( )]

.

From these simulation results at the steady state, we have the following conclusions.
i.

The simulated

curve is constant and it is approximately about

ii.

The simulated HHI curve converges to

.

as the strength of stand-alone value

increases.
From (6.2.6), the higher value of

shows that the location is more significant than

network externality, which is non-network good case. Consequently, all firms will split
the market equally. If a firm needs to monopolize the market, then policy maker should
make

as low as possible.

6.5.5 Strength of Network Externality
We measure the strength of network externality through constants,
strength of network externality of

. We vary the

and investigate its influence by varying

That is, we assign the values of the parameters

and allow

.
to vary on

. In short, we have the following:

Under this scenario, we plot the market share of
of network externality,

.
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and HHI as a function of the strength

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.9 Simulated result showing influence of strength of network externality on two
characteristics
Figure 6.9a and Figure 6.9b illustrate the influence of strength of network externality on
the average of two characteristics. At the initial time, [

( )]

[

( )]

. From these simulation results at the steady state, we have the following.
i.

The simulated

curve is non-decreasing and converging to dominant

situation whenever the strength of network externality is increasing.
ii.

The simulated HHI curve converges to dominant situation as the strength of
network externality increases.

From (6.2.6), for higher value of
other firms. If

, the influence of

is more significant than the

is higher than the others, then this leads to monopoly of

in the

market. Moreover, under the lager number of competitors, the higher value of

is

required to monopolize the market.

6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the dominance of the network good under the influence of
local network externality. Due to the local network externality concept, the consumer’s
utility is affected by the size of local neighborhood instead of the entire market. We
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develop the network structure, utility function and consumer decision rule under the local
network externality in the context of economic concepts. In addition, we introduce an
agent-based modeling simulation (ABMS) as a main tool of this analysis. Using this
model, we investigate the effects of five network attributes on two characteristics of
market equilibrium, market share of

and HHI for various number of firms (

). Five network attributes are represented by: consumer radius ( ), initial
market share of

( ), price of

of network externality of

(
(

), strength of stand alone value ( ) and strength

) . Based on our simulation study, we draw the

following conclusions:
1. As the consumer radius increases, the chance of monopoly increases. Moreover,
under the larger number of competitors, the larger radius is required to
monopolize the market.
2. The higher the initial market share, the higher the chance of a firm to monopolize
the market. Moreover, under the larger number of competitors, the larger initial
market share is required to monopolize the market.
3. The increase in price causes to decrease its market share to zero. Moreover, under
the larger number of competitors, the firm that has high price is driven out faster.
4. As the strength of stand-alone value increases, the chance of monopoly decreases.
5. The increase of strength of network externality influences to increases the chance
of firm to dominate the market. Moreover, under the larger number of
competitors, the higher strength of network externality is required to monopolize
the market.
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Finally, the byproduct of our study in Section 6.5 generates some market strategies for
leading firms to monopolize the market and for small firms to survive (predator and prey
relationship). Moreover, this result extends the conclusion of Paothong (2013), that is,
this work shows not only the policy of leading and small firms but also the policy of high
and low competition. The conclusion is summarized in the following table.
Finally, the byproduct of our study in Section 6.5 generates some market strategies for
leading firms to monopolize the market and for small firms to survive (predator and prey
relationship). This result extends the conclusion of Paothong (2013), that is, this work
provides policy for the largest and smallest firm. Moreover, it also provides a policy for
small and large number of competitors. The conclusion is summarized in the following
table.
Table 6.4 Strategies of firm to monopolize and survive in the market
Size of Firm
Number of Competitors
Consumer Radius
Price
Strength of Stand Alone Value
Strength of Network Externality

Largest
Small
Large
High
Very high
Very low
Low
Low
Low
High
Very high
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Smallest
Small
Large
Very low
Low
Very low
Low
High
High
Very low
Low

CHAPTER 7
FUTURE RESEARCH PLAN

7.1 GNEF under Intervention Process
In Chapter 2, the sign of
(

) or decreasing (

, we have either network externality function increasing
) . However, this phenomenon can be interrupted by

incorporating the discrete time intervention process (Ladde (2005), Ladde et al (2012)).
In the modeling of network externality process, this intervention idea is indeed motivated
by the overall policy of network/users or provider. In fact, the idea of intervention
maintains competitive/cooperative behavior of the comparable network goods. This
indeed avoids monopoly of a market of network goods.

7.2 Further Extension of ABMS of Two Firms
In future work, we plan to relax some of the assumptions and develop more complex
network model. For example, we plan to investigate a complex network such as adaptable
consumers’ and firms’ location, heterogeneous radius, non-uniform distribution for
consumer location, non-Bernoulli distribution for consumer types, etc.
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7.3 Further Extension of ABMS of Multi Firms
In the future work, we plan to relax some of the assumptions and develop more complex
network model. For example, we plan to investigate a complex network such as adaptable
location, heterogeneous radius, non-uniform distribution for consumer location, etc.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we plan to relax some of the assumptions and develop more
complex network model. For example,


Non-uniform distribution for consumer location,



Non Bernoulli distribution for consumer types,



The locations of firms are not at the vertices of regular convex M polygon.



The consumer radius is heterogeneous and adaptable.



The price of goods is heterogeneous and adaptable.
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( )
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APPENDIX A
Expected Values of Characteristics of Market Equilibrium

In Chapter 5, employing the ABMS for two firms, we generate the locations of all
(

consumers by uniform distribution,
types by Bernoulli distribution,

( )

). Moreover, we also generate their
( ) where

[

( )

].

Based on the simulation, we can determine the expectation of all variables at the initial
state.
A.1. Stand-Alone Value
From (5.2.4), the expected value of the stand-alone value at the initial state is
[ ]

[

]

[

]

(

).

(A.1)

A.2. Market Share
From (5.3.1), the expected value of the market share of the Type-A good at the initial
state is determined by
[

( )]

∑

[

( )]

(A.2)

.

A.3. Market Utility
From (5.3.3), we compute the expected market utility at the initial time by the summation
of the expected values of utility of all consumers, [

( )]

∑

[ ( )]

[ ( )]. Using (5.2.7), the expected utility for each consumer at the initial tine is
determined by
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(

[ ])
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) (
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(
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(A.3)

From (A.3), we obtain
[ ( )]

{

[

( )]

(

)

(

) ( )

[

( )]

(

)

(

) (

For simplicity, we assume
initial time is [
(

[

( )]

[

[
(

( )[ (

) (
(

)

( )

) ( )
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.
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. Thus, the expected value of the market utility at the

( )]
)

{

(
)

( )]

(

)

[

( )]], that is,

)

)

(

)(

)]

(

)[ (
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)

Using simulation technique, we find the explicit form of

(

.

(A.5)

) ]

in (5.2.10) and

in (5.2.11).

This together with (A.5), we have
(

[

( )]

)

(

{
(

)(

)

[

)
[

(

)]
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]]
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APPENDIX B
Generating Random Points inside Convex M-Polygon

We introduce a method to generate random points uniformly distributed inside the
sided convex polygon ( -gon). We consider a convex -gon (polygon with

sides) in

two dimensional Euclidean space. For simplicity, it will be denoted clockwise by
vertices,

. Thus, the sides of -gon are represented by vectors

in which
(B.1)

.
Because there are

sides, thus the index

is referred as
̅

∑

, and

is referred to

. For example,

. Let ̅ be a point inside convex -gon in which

be a vector that connects ̅ and

, that is

̅.
Then, the convex -gon is partitioned into
triangles by
composed of

(B.2)
triangles by

. We name these

. Each triangle is composed of three vectors, that is
and

. See Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1. Illustration of notation for convex -gon
Let

and

be the area and semi perimeter of

, respectively. By Heron’s formula

(Weisstein, E. W. (n.d.)), we can calculate its area by
{

(‖ ‖
√ (

‖ ‖

‖ ‖)(

‖

‖)

‖ ‖)(

‖

(B.3)

.
‖)

The Simulation Steps
1. Calculate a point inside the convex -gon, ̅
2. Partition the -gon into

triangles,

3. Calculate the area of each triangle
4. Randomly choose a triangle. The probability of choosing a triangle is defined by its
weighted area, that is,

)

( ∑

before. Let
If

(

(∑

)

, where

)

, then choose

If

, then choose

If ∑

∑

, then choose

If ∑

∑

, then choose

, for

5. Generating uniform random points in the chosen triangle

140

(

)

as defined

We employ Weisstein’s methodology (Weisstein, E. W. (n.d.)) to generate random points
that are uniformly distributed in the chosen triangle. Let
̅
quadrilateral. If
to
chosen triangle,

(

). Hence

is a random point that uniformly distributed in the ith
is distributed inside triangle, then return to
. Hence

, otherwise return

is a random point that uniformly distributed in the

. See Figure B.2.

Figure B.2. Illustration of Weisstein’s methodology
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